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I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the 1960s, Japan achieved an astonishing rate of eco-
nomic growth. A major factor supporting this growth was technological
innovations assimilated and utilized by Japanese companies. Most of
these innovations were developed by United States and European re-
search centers, universities, and companies, and later imported into Ja-
pan through various forms of licensing agreements. Consequently,
during this period of rapid economic growth, Japan annually recorded a
large deficit in technology trade with other developed countries.1 Even
today, in spite of the modernization and growth of Japanese industry,
Japan remains a technology-importing nation.2 This technology trade
Research for this Comment was conducted by the author under the auspices of the Center for
the Study of United States-Japan Relations at Northwestern University, School of Law, and the
Council on Foreign Relations in Tokyo.
I Gaikoku Gisu Donyu Nenji Hokoku, Kagakugjutsuchihen (Showa 58) 21-50 (SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY AGENCY ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPORTATION OF TECHNOLOGY, 1950-1983) [herein-
after SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY REPORT]. See also infra apps. A-B. The superficial precision of these
statistics published by the Japanese government belies, to some degree, the true complexity of mea-
suring the scope of technology transfers. M. HARRIS, JAPAN'S ECONOMY AND TRADE WITH THE
UNITED STATES, S. REP. No. 103, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 114, 115 (1985). Ms. Harris described the
complexity in this way:
Technology transfer is such a multifaceted process that it is virtually impossible to measure it
precisely. Technology flows internationally in sales of equipment, technical services (including
feasibility studies and training programs), and patents and licenses, as well as through ex-
changes between technical personnel in different countries and other mechanisms which involve
no recorded sales.
[As the United States does not compile this kind of statistics regarding technology trans-
fers, Japanese government statistics will be used in this Comment. At the outset, however,
some inherent limitations regarding the Japanese mode of measuring technology transfers
should be mentioned.]
Japan's technological balance of payments.. .records payments and receipts for industrial
property rights, as well as technical services. In cases where no payment is made (such as in
some instances of cross-licensing), however, there is no record in the technological balance of
payments. Furthermore, technology transfer can also occur through foreign investment andjoint R&D programs, additional avenues not fully reflected in the technological balance of pay-
ments. In short, the best available indicators do not provide fully accurate measurements of
technology transfer.
Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
2 SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note I, at 20. Regarding the importance of technol-
ogy imports to the Japanese economy, one commentator stated:
[Tihere can be no question that they [technology transfers] were crucial to Japanese economic
growth and that the prices paid were slight compared with what such technology would cost
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deficit with the United States is especially conspicuous.3 This does not
necessarily represent, the relative levels of technological development in
the two countries, however, for there exist alternative explanations for
this deficit.4
The two most important laws affecting technology induction con-
tracts ("TICs")5 in Japan are the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law (the "FECL")6 and the Antimonopoly Law (the "AML").7
today, if it could be bought at any price. Japan imported virtually all of its technology for its
basic and high-growth industries, and it imported the greater proportion of its technology from
the United States.
C. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-
1975 16 (1982). Regarding Japan's importation of technology, another commentator stated that,
"[w]e consider that Japan represents the best example of technology transfer in the world and
throughout history." S. GEE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 29 (1979).
3 SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
4 One alternative explanation is that when one Japanese company licenses technology from a
foreign company, other Japanese companies tend to follow suit and license the same technology to
ensure that they will not fall technologically behind domestic competitors. J. BRANSON, THE JAPA-
NESE CHALLENGE TO U.S. INDUSTRY 40 (1981). Another possible explanation is the relative open-
ness of research centers in the United States, for example on college campuses, as contrasted to the
closed nature of research centers in Japan. T. OZAWA, JAPAN'S TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO
THE WEST, 1950-1974: MOTIVATION AND ACCOMPLISHMENT 27-29 (1974). The attitudes of com-
panies in the two countries toward technology transfers provide yet another explanation. Id. For
instance, many United States companies have traditionally viewed royalty payments received for
technology transfers as windfall profits, and have thus been quite willing to transfer technology on
lenient terms. Id. Whatever the explanation for Japan's technology trade deficit, however, its exist-
ence is likely to continue, even if in an attenuated fashion.
For a recent description of the technology battles between Japan and the United States, see
High Technology. Clash of the Titans, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 1986, at 4-18. This article con-
cludes with an optimistic appraisal for high-technology industries in the United States.
Apart from possessing vastly greater resources of well-trained brains, more diverse and
flexible forms of finance, and a bigger and more acquisitive domestic market, America has one
final decisive factor moving in its favour-the pace of innovation itself.
High-tech products tend to have two things in common: they fall in price rapidly as pro-
duction builds up (they possess steep learning curves) and they get replaced fairly frequently
(they have short life cycles). The trend in high-tech is towards things becoming steeper and
shorter. So the competitive advantage of being first to market is going increasingly to outweigh
almost everything else.
This spells an end to the traditional low-risk, low-cost approach that Japanese companies
have used so successfully to date-coming in second with massive volume and forward prices
after others have primed the market. Henceforth, Japanese firms are going to have to take some
of the same technological risks-and pay the same financial penalties-as everyone else. And
that puts the advantage decidedly on the side of Yankee ingenuity.
5 For a definition of a technology induction contract (a "TIC") under the 1979 Foreign Ex-
change and Foreign Trade Control Law, see infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
6 After World War II, the Gaikoku Kawase oyobi Gaikoku Bdeki Kanri-h5 (Foreign Exchange
and Foreign Trade Control Law), Law No. 228 of 1949 [hereinafter old FECL] and the Gaishi ni
Kansuru Hiritsu (Foreign Investment Law), Law No. 163 of 1950 [hereinafter FIL] made up Ja-
pan's foreign exchange laws. In a significant amendment in 1979, the Diet combined the functions of
the two laws into one new law. Gaikoku Kawase oyobi Gaikoku B(7eki Kanri-hj no Ichibu o Kaisei
Suru Hdritsu (Law to Amend a Part of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law), Law
No. 65 of 1979 [hereinafter FECL].
7 Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kjsei Torihiki no Kakuhj ni Kansuru Horitsu (Act Concern-
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Both laws were enacted at the end of World War II. Both were written
in general terms, as is the case with many Japanese laws, with broad
interpretive and administrative powers given to bureaucratic organs.
Currently, both laws effect what may be termed administrative regula-
tion of TICs through the use of reporting requirements. The FECL re-
quires prior notification by both the Japanese and the foreign party
before the contract is executed8 while, on the other hand, the AML re-
quires the Japanese party to notify the Fair Trade Commission (the
"FTC") within thirty days after the contract is concluded. 9
In the past, chiefly through the use of administrative guidance, the
Japanese government has used these two laws both to restrict the type of
TICs in Japan and to effect the most beneficial terms for the Japanese
parties to TICs. The Japanese government claims, however, that as a
result of liberalization measures, regarding TICs, the FECL is now "free
in principle." 10 One commentator agrees, asserting that the new FECL
no longer has any significant restrictive effect upon TICs. 1 Other com-
mentators and experts disagree, however, claiming that the new FECL
continues to provide broadly for the government option to intervene in
exceptional circumstances relating to TICs.12 These experts also claim
that drastic liberalization of bureaucratic practices will be necessary
before the validity of Japanese claims regarding alleged liberalization can
be accepted.13 Some experts also suggest that the FTC is quite transpar-
ing Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade), Law No. 54 of 1947 [hereinaf-
ter AML].
8 See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. One commentator made the following state-
ment regarding regulation under the FECL:
Before the capital liberalization of the late 1960s and 1970s, no technology entered the country
without MITI's scrutiny and frequent alterations of the terms; no patent rights were ever
bought without MITI's pressuring the seller to lower the royalties or to make other changes
advantageous to Japanese industry as a whole; and no program for the importation of technol-
ogy was ever approved until MITI and its various advisory committees had agreed that the time
was right and that the industry involved was scheduled for "nurturing".
C. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 17.
9 See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
10 Tdkyd Ginkd Tdkyd B6eki Tishi Sidansho, Tainichitishi Handobokku (BANK OF TOKYO,
TRADE AND INVESTMENT INFORMATION SERVICE OFFICE, SETTING UP ENTERPRISES IN JAPAN)
149 (1985)[hereinafter SETTING UP ENTERPRISES].
11 Smith, The Japanese Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and Administrative
Guidance: The Labyrinth and the Castle, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 417 (1984).
12 Shibuya, The Administrative Regulation of Transfer of Technology in Japan, 1 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 18, 22 (1982); Sharp, Japanese Licensing Environment, TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 235-
65 (1985).
13 Interview with a Japanese attorney of the Tokyo affiliate of a large United States law firm, in
Tokyo (June 1985) [hereinafter Japanese attorney interview]. For a description of this research, see
infra note 16. As a further example, one knowledgeable commentator has stated:
Although the Japanese legal structure concerning external transactions has made a dramatic
move toward free trade, administrative guidance as implemented by MITI will likely still play
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ent in its enforcement of the AML and assert that the AML, like the
FECL, does not have a restrictive effect upon TICs. 14 Yet, FTC statistics
regarding cases of the use of administrative guidance against foreign li-
censors in international TICs preclude a simple acceptance of these
claims. 15
The purpose of this Comment is to investigate the current effect of
both the FECL and the AML on TICs.' 6 It begins with a historical anal-
ysis of past applications of these laws to TICs. It then discusses the cur-
rent terms of the AML and the FECL, the government's application of
these terms to TICs, and the effect of this application on the formation of
TICs. This Comment concludes that, although the means of regulation
has changed and there has been some liberalization, the FECL and the
AML continue to create substantial prejudicial effects for the interests of
foreign parties to TICs in Japan, especially in the case of cross-licensing
agreements for certain types of technology.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY ASSISTANCE
AGREEMENTS UNDER JAPAN'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE
CONTROL LAWS
A. The Old Foreign Exchange Control Law and
Foreign Investment Law
1. Regulatory Mechanisms
From shortly after the end of World War II until 1980, technology
assistance agreements in Japan were regulated by either the old FECL or
the Foreign Investment Law (the "FIL").' 7 The FECL was termed ip-
the dominant role in regulating the inflow and outflow of technology under international license
agreements. Consequently, international license agreements will continue to be adjusted to
what MITI perceives as the Japanese national interest.
M. SHARP, supra note 12, at 263.
14 Interview with the Director of the Research Division of the Fair Trade Center, in Tokyo (July
1985); Interview with two Japanese attorneys in a medium-sized law firm, in Tokyo (July 1985).
These interviews were conducted from June to August 1985 while the author was conducting re-
search at the Foreign Trade Council in Tokyo. Most of these attorneys and government officials
requested that their names not be mentioned.
15 For a discussion of cases of Fair Trade Commission ("FTC") administrative guidance, see
infra text accompanying notes 196-211. See also Higgins, Japanese Fair Trade Commission Review
ofInternational Agreements, 3 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 43, 43-66 (1980).
16 The data for the conclusions drawn in this Comment were obtained from extensive interviews
conducted by the author in Tokyo during the summer of 1985 with lawyers, legal scholars, business
executives, and government officials. This is the only research known to the author to investigate
the effects of the FECL and the AML on technology induction contracts.
17 Agreements were divided into two classes-Class A and Class B agreements. FIL art. 10.
Class B agreements, which were usually less important, were handled under the old FECL and
included three types: 1) contracts with a duration of one year or less covering a license, transfer of
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panho (a general law), whereas the FIL was tokubetsuho (a specific
law).II By Japanese rules of statutory construction, as a special law, the
FIL governed all investment activities specifically placed within its juris-
diction while the FECL governed all else.19 Together, the FIL and the
FECL covered almost every kind of transaction and prohibited such
transactions unless prior approval was obtained from the appropriate
ministry.2" In the case of technology assistance agreements, the FIL cov-
ered most significant contracts and, thus for the purpose of this historical
review, the FIL will be the major point of emphasis. The FIL was for-
mation oriented; it required ninka (validation) of all investment contracts
within its purview.2 1 On the other hand, the FECL was performance
oriented; it prohibited all payments or credits between residents and non-
residents unless they first obtained kyoka (approval) from the appropri-
ate ministry or the Bank of Japan (the "BOJ"). 22
The definition of a Technology Assistance Agreement (a "TAA")
under the FIL was as follows: 1) an agreement for the transfer of indus-
trial property rights or other rights concerning technology, or an agree-
ment for the granting of a license to use such rights; 2) agreements for
technical advice or guidance on plant operations; and 3) other transfers
patent, or utility model rights; 2) contracts with a duration of one year or less covering only services,
such as engineering or managerial assistance; and 3) all contracts, whether of more or less than one
year's duration, between foreign parents and domestic branches. All other agreements were Class A
agreements and were regulated under the FIL. Y. TAKAISHi, Foreign Investment Regulations, in
DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 4.08 (1982). See also infra app. C concerning validation for technical
assistance agreements.
The legislative history of the FIL suggests that the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
("SCAP") permitted its passage under the expectation that the law would exist only temporarily.
An official SCAP history described the situation as follows:
This broad enabling act authorized the Government to maintain a unified system of control over
foreign exchange and foreign trade transactions only to the extent necessary to safeguard the
balance of international payments, and in effect transferred to the Government certain responsi-
bilities which had been exercised by SCAP since the beginning of the occupation. The restric-
tions in the law were to be gradually relaxed by cabinet orders and ministerial ordinances as the
need for them subsided.
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED POWERS, Monograph 50, Foreign Trade 110 (1951).
The law, however, persisted for over thirty years and, according to one scholar, "was the single
most important instrument of industrial guidance and control that MITI ever possessed." C. JOHN-
SON, supra note 2, at 195. According to another scholar, "[in liquidating the occupation by handing
back operational control to the Japanese, SCAP naively presided not only over the transfer of its
own authority but also over the institutionalization of the most restrictive foreign trade and foreign
exchange system ever devised by a major free nation." Hollerman, International Economic Controls
in Occupied Japan, 38 J. ASIAN STUD. 719, 719 (1979).
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specified by the competent minister.23 Four central functions developed
for the formal and informal enforcement of FECL terms relating to
TAAs. z4 The most frequently mentioned function was the preservation
and wise use of scarce foreign exchange. z5 A second function was the
control of foreign industries attempting to enter Japan. By controlling
the induction of technology into Japan, the Japanese government could
control at a threshold point foreign operations in Japan. 6 A third func-
tion was the forced licensing of important technology to Japanese compa-
nies as a condition for the initiation of a foreign operation in Japan.27
The Japanese government, through FIL/FECL administrative guidance
pursuant to the FIL/FECL, thus attempted to prevent foreign compa-
nies from gaining monopolistic control of any sector of the economy by
requiring that related Japanese industries be provided the important
technology on reasonable terms. The fourth function was the balancing
of what Japanese bureaucrats frequently perceived to be unequal bargain-
ing power possessed by foreign licensors vis-a-vis the domestic
licensees.2 8
From this kind of governmental participation in the negotiation of
contract terms was born the reputation of Japan as a difficult place to do
business. The perception is that a foreign firm must face two-to-one
23 FIL art. 3.
24 Interview with Amelia Porges, Official at the Office of the United States Trade Representative
(the "USTR"), in Tokyo (Aug. 1985)[hereinafter Porges interview].
25 SETTING UP ENTERPRISES, supra note 10, at 149. After World War ii, Japan suffered from
an extreme shortage of foreign exchange. Japanese governmental leaders had broad plans for re-
building the nation. In order to fulfill such plans, a prerequisite activity was upgrading the level of
technological development of Japanese industry. Governmental officials determined, probably cor-
rectly, that Japan did not have sufficient foreign exchange to allow the free importation of whatever
technology Japanese companies determined to be potentially profitable. Rather, they determined
technology importation should take place only if certain minimum standards were met.
26 Porges interview, supra note 24. In order for a foreign company to establish a joint venture or
a subsidiary in Japan, the foreign company must in many cases also export the necessary technology
into Japan. By delaying or preventing the induction of technology, the Japanese government could
prevent a foreign company from opening an operation in Japan and thereby protect less-advanced
domestic industries in the same field. Japanese attorney interview, supra note 13.
In an important work on the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI"),
one commentator stated that through the FIL/FECL regime, MITI was able to screen and approve
all joint ventures and foreign subsidaries in Japan because "[i]t is hard to imagine a joint venture or
subsidiary that would not include the introduction of some form of technology or know-how." C.
JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 279.
27 D. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 445. For example are these multiple conditions for valida-
tion of Texas Instruments' application which was filed in January 1964 and finally granted in 1968:
1) 50-50 equity in the joint venture; 2) curtailed production for several years in order to not disturb
domestic production; and 3) the patents of Texas Instruments were to be made public by licensing to




odds: the foreign company must negotiate and compete not only against
the Japanese company but also against the Japanese government.2 9 The
Japanese government initially required affirmative proof that a technol-
ogy transfer would benefit the Japanese economy before the government
would approve it.30 Parties to a TAA were required to convince the ap-
propriate ministry that a proposed transaction would positively benefit
the Japanese economy and, thus, should receive the special privilege of
contract validation. This requirement, combined with the broad powers
of bureaucratic discretion in the Japanese ministries, created in the min-
istries an ability to use administrative guidance effectively to suspend
what was determined to be an undesireable agreement or to force modifi-
cations in other agreements in order to benefit the Japanese parties.
2. Gradual Liberalization of Regulatory Mechanisms
Under the FIL/FECL
The liberalization of Japan's regulation of TAAs through the FIC
and the FECL was a gradual process that occurred over two decades,
from the early 1960s to the early 1980s."' Governmental action affecting
29 Id.
30 FIL art. 8, § 1 provides the following positive proof standard.
1. The competent Minister shall apply the following standards on validating contracts in
this Law, and the priority shall be given to those which will most speedily and effectively con-
tribute to an improvement in- the international balance of payment.
1) Directly or indirectly contributing to the improvement of the international balance
of payments, or
2) Directly or indirectly contributing to the development of essential industries or pub-
lic enterprises, or
3) Necessary for continuation of existing technological assistance contracts concerning
industries or public enterprises or for the alteration of the articles of the contracts concerned,
such as a renewal.
Id.
Section 2 of the same article provided for a negative standard. Under this standard, trans-
actions would not be prohibited unless they had a specified negative effect on the Japanese
economy.
2. The competent Minister shall not validate contracts prescribed in this Law which fall
under any of the following paragraphs:
I) Contracts the provisions of which are not fair, or are in contravention of laws and
regulations.
2) Contracts which are deemed to be concluded or the alteration of articles of which
such as renewal of the contracts deemed to be made in a manner not free from fraud, duress or
undue influence.
3) When deemed to have an adverse effect on the rehabilitation of the Japanese
economy.
Id. art. 1, § 2.
31 A general understanding of the liberalization process can be obtained from the following sy-
nopsis of the history of modifications of the FIL and old FECL.
Mar. 15, 1949. Accompanying the enactment of the Cabinet Order regarding acquisition
of foreign property, the requirement of Foreign Trade Council approval for technology induc-
tion contracts.
Dec. 1, 1949. Accompanying the enactment of the FECL, the requirement of payment
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this liberalization, save for the 1980 amendment modifying the FECL
and abolishing the FIL, took place on the level of cabinet and ministerial
orders.32 The most important of these orders were promulgated in 1968,
1973, and 1978. The 1968 order provided for automatic validation of
TICs with payment terms under $50,000, and one-month BOJ validation
for liberalized technologies, but with ministerial approval only for non-
liberalized technologies.33 According to one commentator, subsequent to
this order, TICs into Japan went a long way toward being fully liberal-
approval for contracts of less than three months and service approval for contracts greater than
three months.
May 10, 1950. Accompanying the enactment of the FECL, the requirement that contracts
for more than one year (A-type technical assistance) receive approval of the Foreign Investment
Council.
July 1, 1952. Partial amendment of the Foreign Investment Law such that approval was
unnecessary in cases not requiring foreign payment but was required for contracts with either
the payment period or terms exceeding one year.
July 21, 1959. Adoption of an approval system under the FECL and the FIL for hereto-
fore unrecognized and less important technologies. Abolition of approval system under FIL
because of substantial duplication.
May 23, 1961. Bank of Japan ["BOJ"] approval sufficient for less important matters (e.g.,
expenses for visiting technicians, payment for use of diagrams if under $50,000 per case, etc.).
Apr. 25, 1962. BOJ approval sufficient for contracts to be concluded within one year with
payment terms of less than $10,000 (B-type technical assistance contracts).
July 1, 1963. BOJ approval sufficient for contracts to be concluded within one year with
payment terms of less than $30,000.
Apr. 1, 1964. Approval requirement under the FIL for contracts of over one year regard-
less of payment terms. (Previously, the approval requirement was for remittance of payment
rather than approval of the contract itself.)
Apr. 1, 1964. Approval requirement under the FECL for contracts between the home
company of a foreign juridical entity in Japan and its Japanese subsidiary. (Previously, the
approval requirement was for remittance of payment rather than approval of the contract it-
self.)
Aug. 1, 1966. Automatic validation through BOJ for limiting scope of patents, etc., as
designated by the appropriate ministry.
June 1, 1968. Execution of mechanism for liberalization of technology inductions follow-
ing the Cabinet determinations of May 1968. (Automatic BOJ validation for contracts with
payment terms under fifty thousand dollars. Nonliberalized technologies such as aircraft, arms,
gun powder, atomic power, space development, electronic computers, and petroleum chemicals
require approval from an appropriate ministry. Other technologies require BOJ validation
within one month after filing a request.)
Dec. 3, 1973. Automatic BOJ validation if payment terms are under $300,000 (except
payment terms must be under $100,000 in the case of aircraft, arms, gun powder, atomic power,
space development, and electronic computers).
Apr. 1, 1978. Automatic validation for other than designated technologies. Aircraft,
arms, gunpowder, atomic energy, space development, electronic computers, electronic parts for
electronic computers of the next generation, appliances for laser processing and light communi-
cation, innovative materials, aluminum refining, salt electrolysis by non-mercurial methods, pe-
troleum production at sea bottom, and leather or leather products are established as designated
technologies. Also, shift to a prior notification system for contracts to be concluded within one
year.
Dec. 1, 1980. Adoption of prior notification system (with some conditions including meas-
ures which may be taken to request or demand suspension or modification of the contract).
Unpublished Bank of Japan circular received during interview with K. Tsuchiya, Assistant Advisor,





ized.3a The 1973 order provided for automatic BOJ validation for TICs
with payment terms under $300,000. The 1978 order also established the
system of designated technologies,35 with automatic validation for TICs
other than designated technologies, and instituted a prior notification
system for TICs to be concluded within one year.
Whatever the formal mechanisms established by law, the most im-
portant factor in liberalizing TICs to Japan was the informal actions of
Japanese bureaucracies.36 It appears that along with liberalizations of
formal regulatory mechanisms relating to TICs in Japan has come, at
least to some extent, the liberalization of bureaucratic enforcement of the
same.37 It is interesting to note the reasons for the gradual liberalization
of the FECL as to TICs. The first important reason is what Japanese
disparagingly term as gai-atsu (foreign pressure).38 With Japan's eco-
nomic growth and development, its IMF reclassification, and its mem-
bership in the Overseas Council for Economic Development (the
"OECD"), came increasing pressure from foreign governments to reduce
the amount of formal and informal governmental interference with tech-
nology transactions.39 The second major reason for liberalization was
the greatly reduced need for governmental interference in technology
transactions. By the mid- and late-1960s, Japan had developed sufficient
economic strength that the broad and extreme restrictions on TAAs were
no longer necessary to preserve foreign exchange or protect infant do-
mestic industries. Besides, other mechanisms existed for protection of
domestic industries that were being used increasingly in place of the
FECL regulations.'
3. Effect of FIL/FECL Regulations on the Formation of TAAs
Formal and informal enforcement of the FIL/FECL prejudiced the
interests of the foreign licensor. This was due to the broad and intrusive
34 D. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 229.
35 For a current list of designated technologies under the FECL, see infra app. D.
36 D. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 195-208.
37 Id.
38 Kawamura, History of Japanese Foreign Exchange and Foreign Investment Control, in LAW
AND BUSINESS IN JAPAN 73 (1982).
39 Id. at 74.
40 Interview with Toshio Nakamura, Executive Director of the Chicago Office of the Japan Ex-
ternal Trade Organization ("JETRO"), in Chicago (May 1985). It is true that some high technology
or especially depressed industries received the special status of a nonliberalized industry or a desig-
nated technology. Even now under the new FECL, the Japanese government monitors quite closely
technology transactions in these areas. The likelihood, however, that the Japanese government will
take direct action to prevent a certain TAA or alter its terms decreased greatly in the 1970s and
1980s so that it is now relatively rare.
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nature of TAA regulations under the old FIL/FECL regime. The effects
discussed in this section place in context the following section regarding
the new FECL. That section examines a key concern of this Comment:
the extent to which intrusive practices established under the old FIL/
FECL regime continue under the new FECL.
a. Time delays
The first type of prejudicial effect resulting from enforcement of the
FIL/FECL was time delays. Delays were likely under the early FIL/
FECL regime because the ministries had the right to sit on an application
for TAA approval without taking any action whatsoever. 4 This kind of
inaction was also often a method to force a cancellation or modification
of the request for TAA approval or simply provide the Japanese compa-
nies in the same industry with additional time to prepare for the entrance
of strong foreign competitors into the Japanese market. In one interest-
ing example of this type of delay, Texas Instruments filed, in 1964, an
application for approval to establish a wholly owned subsidiary in Japan,
which included a request to transfer to the subsidiary the relevant tech-
nology.42 The Japanese government did not reply to this application for
two years and seven months. When the government did finally reply, it
strongly suggested, through administrative guidance, modification of the
terms of the application, including open licensing of Texas Instrument's
Japanese patents to Japanese companies. Finally, four years after the
original application was filed, and upon Texas Instrument's submission
to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's ("MITI") terms,
the application was approved.43
Another case involved a United States lock manufacturer, Yale and
Towne, Incorporated.' Yale and Towne applied similarly for approval
to form a subsidiary in Japan and transfer technology to that subsidiary.
This application was filed in 1964, but the application was withdrawn in
1975 by the applicants in compliance with informal requests by MITI
officials." Many other United States and European companies were
delayed in similar fashion.4 6
41 Smith, supra note 11, at 424. The author here suggests that "the significance of the 1980
liberalization in procedure was that it made it more difficult for the ministries to exercise administra-
tive guidance because they could no longer hold up a transaction by doing nothing based on the
negative principle." Id.
42 D. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 445.
43 Id.
44 Kawamura, supra note 38, at 80.
45 Id.
46 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (the "OECD") reported the
following degree of intervention of the Japanese government:
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With the adoption of the BOJ approval and automatic validation for
certain liberalized technologies,47 delays were reduced. Even in the case
of nonliberalized technologies, after the middle of the 1970s, delays from
purposeful ministerial nonaction were relatively nonexistent.48 Even
with liberalized technologies, however, TAA parties were required by
governmental order to wait a minimum of thirty days after application
approval to begin performance of the contract.49 In the case of nonliber-
alized technologies, the delays tended to be somewhat longer as the min-
istries often required time to review the application before giving formal
approval.50
b. Restrictive effect of the reporting requirements
This type of restrictive effect refers specifically to the expense and
inconvenience of the reporting procedure. The reporting requirements
force a party to gather the necessary information, fill in the forms cor-
rectly, and wait for the appropriate Japanese agencies to accept the ap-
proval application. It is related to other effects such as delays or forced
alteration or cancellation of the TAAs through administrative guidance.
Under the old FIL/FECL regime, completion of the application
procedures was considerably more difficult than it is today under the new
FECL. First, it was sometimes difficult to determine which of the laws,
the FIL or the FECL, would be applicable.51 Second, enforcement of the
FIL/FECL was not based strictly on a rule of law as much as what bu-
reaucrats thought was appropriate or beneficial for the situation.52
Third, even if specific bureaucratic regulations and circulars did exist,
they were not published as extensively as they are today.5" Fourth, there
was a scarcity of legal experts who could advice foreign companies on the
The scope of the technology is frequently changed; the royalties and initial payments are re-
duced; minimum royalties and back royalties are reduced; minimum royalties and back royal-
ties are eliminated; arrangements must be made for the Japanese partner to get privileged access
to certain foreign markets; provisions are disallowed under which the Japanese partner re-
nounces manufacture of the product after the expiration of the contract; sublicensing is made
subject to further governmental approval; undertakings are deleted under which the Japanese
partner would hand over a list of his customers at the end of the contract; the duration of the
contract is reduced; automatic renewal is excluded, etc.
OECD, LIBERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS: JAPAN 57-58 (1968).
Among the United States companies that have been particularly affected by restrictive enforce-
ment of FIL/FECL are Avon, Norton Co., General Foods, Ampex, and IBM. D. HENDERSON,
supra note 18, at 208.
47 D. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 229.
48 Kawamura, supra note 38, at 7-18.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 D. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 217.
52 Id. at 195-96.
53 Id.
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execution of a TAA in Japan. 4 Finally, there were frequent requests
from government ministries to provide additional information concern-
ing the terms of the proposed TAA 5
c. The effect of reporting requirements of the FIL/FECL on the
bargaining power of the respective parties
Under the early FIL/FECL regime, the Japanese government
played a major role in the negotiation of TAAs 6 It is through this type
of involvement that the Japanese government and Japanese companies
combined earned the name "Japan, Inc." In terms of bargaining power,
the effect of the Japanese government's involvement in the negotiation
process created a two-to-one bargaining situation, with the foreign com-
pany pitted against the Japanese government and the Japanese com-
pany.57 In terms of altered bargaining power alone, enforcement of the
FIL/FECL can be said to have caused significant and frequent modifica-
tions in TAA terms in favor of the Japanese parties.
The effect of the FIL/FECL reporting requirements on bargaining
power results from several different causes. First, the amount of legal
and technical information possessed by the respective parties has a signif-
icant effect on the relative bargaining strength of the two parties.5 8 The
54 Japanese attorney interview, supra, note 13.
55 Id. Approval application under the early FIL/FECL can be understood as an attempt to
convince government officials that a special privilege of selling technology to a Japanese company
should be granted to the foreign company. Thus, foreign companies were often at the mercy of the
Japanese government; they had to sell the Japanese ministry on the benefits of a particular transac-
tion and their willingness to cooperate with the Japanese government.
56 Id.
57 D. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 207. Henderson described this situation as follows:
Foreigners have often negotiated a licensing or joint-venture contract, with detailed terms repre-
senting their maximum concessions, assuming (we do not say with justification) that the con-
tract would be approved or disapproved, as signed by the parties, under Japan's "free
enterprise" system. But the official practice was for years, and in the case-by-case screening of
important cases still is, for the government to go over contract terms and suggest revisions in
the favor of the Japanese party. Of course sophisticated foreigners with experience have long
been aware of the "two-against-one" routine-as it was known among foreigners. But it often
caught first-timers unawares, because there were for years no guidelines that specified the outer
limits of key terms such as royalty rates or foreign management participation; nevertheless, the
foreigners were frequently subjected to officially required reductions, sometimes beyond the
point at which business was voluntarily possible and despite mutual interest between the parties
on the agreed terms.
Id.
58 Japanese attorney interview, supra note 13. This kind of technical information was necessary
to prove to the Japanese ministries the fairness of the numerous provisions of the TAA. For exam-
ple, if the Japanese licensee is able to receive information from the Japanese government about the
efficacy of the technology which the licensor is preparing to sell, the licensee may be able to bargain
more effectively for price or other terms. Similarly, if the licensee can receive information about




amount of technical information possessed by the parties, especially in
the days of kobetsu shinsa (case-by-case analysis), was largely dependent
upon the closeness of their relationship with the applicable government
ministries.5 9 Second, well-established Japanese firms with extensive con-
nections in important government ministries often were able to influence
ministries to aid them in obtaining more beneficial TAA terms.60
d. Effect of administrative guidance pursuant to the FIL/FECL
The chief means of enforcement under the old FIL/FECL regime
was through "administrative guidance."61 The effects of the execution of
administrative guidance pursuant to the old FIL/FECL have already
been mentioned, but they are summarized here in the context of adminis-
trative guidance. As a result of informal actions taken by government
officials, the execution dates of TAAs have been significantly delayed un-
59 Y. NUNOl, The Know-How Contract in Japan, in THE KNow-How CONTRACT IN GER-
MANY, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 176 (1984).
60 Japanese attorney interview, supra note 13. The interconnected nature of Japanese business
and government can be illustrated by several interesting phenomena. One is amakudari, translated
literally as "falling from the sky." This term refers to the practice of businesses hiring retired gov-
ernment officials. By Japanese reasoning, the bureaucrat is lowered from the bureaucracy (the sky)
to a business firm (the ground). The effect of this practice is to plant well-connected and influential
bureaucrats in various Japanese firms. These "fallen" bureaucrats can be very effective in obtaining
information from and in influencing bureaucrats in their former government office. Among other
important practices is the extensive cooperation between Japanese firms and the government in in-
dustry cartels and research. For examples of the Japanese government's attempts to enforce this
kind of cooperation through administrative guidance, see Young, Judicial Review of Administrative
Guidance: Governmentally Ensured Consentual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 923
(1984).
61 A common definition given to "administrative guidance" in the Japanese context is a "request
by an administrative body for voluntary cooperation." Matsushita, Administrative Guidance and
Economic Regulation in Japan, 1 JAPAN Bus. L. J. 209 (1980). See also Narita, Administrative
Guidance, LAW IN JAPAN 45 (1969); Yamanouchi, Administrative Guidance and the Rule of Law,
LAW IN JAPAN 45 (1974).
Professor Matsushita presented the following characteristics of administrative guidance in Ja-
pan: 1) compliance is legally voluntary; 2) administrative guidance is de facto direction by the gov-
ernment and does not automatically become an official action of the government; 3) as an expression
of a government policy, administrative guidance should be distinguished from private conduct by
officials; 4) administrative guidance is a form of government regulation imposing rules of conduct on
private persons; 5) even though administrative guidance is informal, it is done with government
officials in a superior, not equal, position vis-a-vis the private parties; 6) there is no precise procedure
or delineated scope for administrative guidance. Matsushita, at 210.
Some commentators have extolled the virtues of administrative guidance in effecting industrial
policy, but other commentators have been more critical, stressing that numerous problems may
result. The problems of administrative guidance begin when it is suspected that a ministry is not
neutral on an issue it is arbitrating, or when it has been captured by the parties in the arbitration, or
when its administrative guidance is really only a governmental cloak hiding an otherwise illegal
cartel, or when the deliberation councils in which administrative guidance is carried out have been
packed with people predisposed to a certain view. C. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 267.
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til an approval application is withdrawn or modified or until governmen-
tal officials determine that the relevant domestic industry has had
sufficient time to prepare for the entrance of the foreign competitor.
Consequently, the bargaining power of foreign companies is significantly
weakened. In addition, at times the Japanese government informally re-
quested changes in the terms of a TAA with the view toward aiding or
protecting the Japanese party. All of these informal governmental ac-
tions may be regarded as forms of administrative guidance. Through
such informal administrative actions, the Japanese government was able
to regulate the introduction of technology, and therefore, firmly control
at a threshold point the entrance of foreign companies into Japan.
II. THE AMENDED FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND FOREIGN TRADE
CONTROL LAW
A. Introduction
The decreased need for blanket control regulations and the increas-
ing foreign pressure for liberalization of its foreign exchange laws in-
duced the Japanese government to begin a gradual process of
liberalization of the FIL and the FECL beginning in the mid- to late-
1960s. Conceptually, the strict and complete regulation of technology
transfers into Japan gradually evolved into a system in which transfers
were gensoku kinshi (prohibited in principle), yet freely permitted in an
increasing number of cases. This system, however, was still an approval
or validation system that required the positive permission of appropriate
governmental ministries in a significant number of cases.6 2 Furthermore,
this system was fraught with the complexities resulting from the overlap-
ping coverage of the FIL and the FECL.
Consequently, in 1979 and 1980 the Diet enacted a major overhaul
of the FIL/FECL system. In a word, it abolished the FIL, vesting full
authority in a revised FECL63 and ministerial ordinances' and changed
the approval and validation system to one of prior notification. Japanese
government officials repeatedly emphasize that the change to the new
FECL effected a change from gensoku kinshi (a prohibited-in-principle
system) to gensoku jiyti (a free-in-principle system).65 These officials
often emphasize that, with the new FECL, reporting procedures have
been significantly simplified and rationalized.66
62 Smith, supra note 11, at 422-24.
63 For the new FECL provisions relating to TICs, see infra app. E.
64 For the ministerial ordinances relevant to TICs, see infra app. F.





Some commentators claim that the system had been de facto liberal-
ized by the early- or mid-1970s and that the 1980 amendments effect only
a nominal change in actual procedure.67 Others assert that bureaucratic
practices are the most important element to consider in determining the
effect of the FECL and conclude that, because bureaucratic practices
were still not liberalized after 1980, an amendment to the Diet Act would
have little effect on actual practice.68 Still others claim that because of
the change from an approval or validation system to a prenotification
system, administrative guidance has become much more difficult for min-
istries to execute. 9 According to this rationale, administrative guidance
has been the most important element in producing major restrictive ef-
fects on TICs. Consequently, the increasing difficulty in its execution
should force significant liberalization of actual procedures.
Another view holds that, with the old FIL/FECL regime, the gov-
ernment aggressively regulated the inflow of technology, but, with the
new FECL, the government carefully controls the outflow of certain
technologies.70 This view would lead to the conclusion that, although
TICs involving only the inflow of technology are generally unrestricted,
TICs with cross-licensing or grant-back provisions still require approval
from MITI. 1 Thus, there remain differences of opinion on the state of
the law and actual practice as to TICs. The following portion of the
Comment examines these differing opinions and determines which most
accurately represents actual administrative practice. In so doing, it will
describe the extent and degree of formal and informal restrictive effects
that continue to result from enforcement of Japan's foreign exchange
laws.
B. Express Purpose of the New FECL with Respect to TICs
Article 1 of the FECL sets out the fundamental purpose of the
legislation:
This law aims at ensuring basic freedom of foreign exchange, foreign trade
and other international transactions, and facilitating orderly development
of international transactions through exercising an avoidable, minimum
control or adjustment, providing thereby for an equilibrium in the balance
of payments, the stability of the currency, and the sound development of
our national economy.72
67 D. HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 229.
68 Shibuya, supra note 12, at 20.
69 Smith, supra note 11, at 424.
70 Sharp, supra note 12, at 246.
71 Id.
72 FECL art. I (emphasis added).
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Article 1 presents the general purpose of the act: ensuring free and
orderly international transactions. The reference to an "unavoidable,
minimum control," however, when combined with provisions in later ar-
ticles providing for such controls seems to provide broad justification for
continued governmental interference in such transactions. Later articles,
specifically referring to TICs, provide that the Japanese government may
require delays, modifications, or cancellations in TICs if they are deemed
to affect adversely "national security, public order," or domestic "busi-
ness enterprises. ' ' 73 Yet, as has been frequently emphasized, actual bu-
reaucratic practices are more important in determining the effect of a
general authorization act than are the provisions of the act itself. None-
theless, the Japanese government continues to cling to the policy that a
degree of entry-level control over technology transfers is necessary to en-
sure continued economic growth and stability.74
C. Functions of the New FECL with Respect to TICs
For TICs, "this unavoidable, minimum control" effected by the
FECL takes the form of a notification requirement prior to execution of
the contract. According to many legal practitioners and business execu-
tives, the FECL no longer presents a restrictive, prohibitive barrier to
TICs.75 Many still complain, however, about the troublesomeness of the
present reporting requirement despite its declared liberalization.76 They
see little use in a reporting requirement because the checking procedures
completed by the BOJ and government ministries are almost wholly pro
73 FECL art. 29. See also infra app. E.
74 The author questioned a MITI official who participates in FECL administration about what
types of emergency cases regarding TICs would cause Japanese government officials to take action
to modify or cancel a TIC pursuant to emergency provisions in the FECL. The official described a
situation similar to an oil crisis, but this hardly relates to TICs and would not likely require an
emergency provision in the FECL to effect action. Interview with M. Noburu, Office for the Promo-
tion of Foreign Investment in Japan, MITI, in Tokyo (July 1985)[hereinafter Noburu interview].
Many Japanese attorneys seriously question whether this emergency power will ever be used and
believe that it should be repealed for public relations purposes. Japanese attorney interview, supra
note 13; Interview with a Japanese attorney and part-time professor of law, in Tokyo (July
1985)[hereinafter Law professor interview].
75 This statement is based on numerous interviews conducted by the author in Tokyo from June
to August 1985. See supra note 16. The responses were quite uniform. There may be areas in which
the Japanese government continues to restrict foreign investment under the FECL but technology
transfers is not one of these. One USTR official stated that she had recently contacted numerous
business firms to inquire whether any of them had any difficulty under the new FECL with the
execution of TICs in Japan. The response uniformly conveyed was that there were no longer any
significant problems. Porges interview, supra note 24.
76 Interview with Japanese attorney at a small Japanese law firm, in Tokyo (June 1985)[hereinaf-
ter Small Japanese law firm interview]; Law professor interview, supra note 74.
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forma.7 7 These circumstances demonstrate that there remain significant
doubts as to the feasibility of the screening function that the FECL per-
forms with respect to TICs.
Although the new FECL has not previously been used effectively to
screen out TICs potentially detrimental to Japanese parties individually
or to the Japanese economy as a whole, the potential for this function
remains. In fact, it is the most readily apparent function of the new
FECL. Thus, the new FECL may provide a mechanism by which the
government can restrict or suspend transactions which are determined to
imperil the national security, disturb the public order, or adversely affect
domestic business.78 In a sense, the existence of this latent power contra-
dicts strong assertions by the government that there are no restrictive
effects with the new FECL.7 9 This power, however, has never been for-
mally used in relation to TICs and there appears little possibility that
such use will occur in the future.80
The second function of the new FECL is that of information gather-
ing.81 Based on the reports filed with the BOJ, government officials col-
lect and analyze extensive information relating to TICs.82 For instance,
the Science and Technology Agency publishes an annual report on TICs
in Japan.8 3
Judging simply from the nonuse of the express statutory power to
cancel or modify potentially detrimental TICs, the complaints of schol-
ars, lawyers, and business executives that there is not a substantial func-
tion for the TIC reporting requirements under the FECL appear quite
reasonable. Nonuse of express statutory powers, however, must be dis-
tinguished from nonuse of informal powers such as administrative gui-
dance. Use or nonuse of express statutory power is easy to document.
Use of administrative guidance, however, is almost never known to any-
one outside the parties to the transaction. Therefore, it is quite simple
for Japanese government officials now to claim that statutory FECL
powers regarding TICs have never been used, but it is difficult to prove
that informal persuasive powers of bureaucrats have not been used to
influence the terms of a TIC.
77 Id.
78 FECL arts. 29-30; see also app. E.
79 Noburu interview, supra note 74.
80 Id.
81 Interview with MITI official, in Tokyo (Aug. 1985); Interview with Bank of Japan official, in
Tokyo (July 1985).
82 Id.
83 See supra note 1.
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D. Definitions of Applicable Terms Under the New FECL
In the context of the new FECL, there is a special group of service
transactions, separate from and traditionally more strictly supervised
than others, known as "conclusion of contracts for the induction of tech-
nology."84 These are the TICs discussed in this Comment. The "induc-
tion of technology" means any transfer of industrial property rights,
rights over other technologies, and business managerial expertise.85
E. Effect on TICs of the New FECL
1. Frequency and Duration of Time Delays in TIC Execution
from the New FECL
The first type of effect that has been shown to have existed under the
old FIL/FECL was time delays.8 6 Delays of a couple of weeks or
months would probably not be particularly detrimental to either the Jap-
anese or foreign party.87 But if the resulting delay takes over six months,
there is a possible detriment to a foreign firm trying to introduce technol-
ogy in order to establish a joint venture or a subsidiary in Japan.88 Such
a delay could also harm a Japanese firm seeking to introduce a new tech-
nology in an industry of rapid technological growth.89
The first type of delays that may occur under the new FECL is pre-
notification. This type of delay occurs when the BOJ, for whatever rea-
84 See infra apps. E-F.
85 SETTING UP ENTERPRISES, supra note 10, at 150-52. In this context, the following definitions
are especially relevant.
"Conclusion" means either a conclusion or a renewal of a contract or alteration of contract
terms.
"Industrial property right" means a patent right, a utility model right, a design right, or a
trademark right.
"Rights over other technologies" means any right concerning industrial expertise, includ-
ing blue prints, specifications, information, know-how, etc., on the manufacture of products
which do not constitute industrial property rights.
"Business managerial expertise" refers to expertise on the management of a factory, such
as quality control methods, stock control methods, labor management techniques, etc., and to
expertise on effective business management, such as publicity methods and market research
methods.
"Conclusions of contract" include any succession of the status of a party to the existing
contract through merger or consolidation, transfer of business assets, a transfer of contract, etc.
"Alteration of contract provisions" means alteration of any of the following particulars of
an existing, legally concluded contract within its term as notified to the government, including
any correction of clerical errors or other mistakes after the notice has been received; (i) kind of
technology, (ii) term of contract, (iii) remuneration, (iv) method of payment, (v) outline of
introduction of technology as given in the notice, and possible area of export, (vi) description of
technology.
Id.
86 See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
87 Interviews with attorneys, in Tokyo (June-July 1985).




son, refuses to accept formally the notification forms. The BOJ may
refuse to accept the notification forms if there are obvious errors or insuf-
ficiencies in the provision of information with the forms,90 or if in the
case of a TIC involving a designated technology, the failure of the parties
to consult adequately with the Ministry of Finance (the "MOF") or an-
other appropriate ministry.9 1
The frequency of delays resulting from alleged errors in the informa-
tion provided on the notification forms under the new FECL should be
minimal. The notification forms are not especially difficult to complete
as shown by the fact that most notification forms are handled by parale-
gals or non-lawyer members of a certain company.92 Furthermore, in the
case of nondesignated technologies, the review of the forms by the BOJ is
chiefly pro forma. In such cases, if an obvious error were to exist, the
BOJ would call the responsible firm member or paralegal and the prob-
lem would most likely be corrected, with formal notification accepted
within a week.93
Insufficiencies of information may be a slightly more difficult issue.94
The notification procedures require that the submitting party provide a
description of the "type of technology" involved in the TIC.95 The ten-
dency of TIC parties, especially in the case of know-how, has been to
provide as vague a description as possible.96 In the case of nondesignated
technologies, if the description provides enough concrete information for
BOJ officials to fit the particular TIC into a certain pigeonhole of tech-
nology type for statistical purposes, then the description will most likely
be accepted. 97
There is also a potential problem if the submitting party does not
90 The notification forms require that the following information be included: 1) name, address,
and type of business of the submitting parties; 2) kind of technology; 3) period of the contract;
4) contract payment scheme; 5) outline of agreement; 6) content of technology; 7) reason for conclu-
sion of TIC; 8) summary of industrial property rights; 9) production plan under imported technol-
ogy. Attached Form No. 9, Notification or Conclusion or Alteration of Agreements for Importation
of Technology (available from Foreign Department, Bank of Japan). This is, of course, just an
English translation of the information that must be provided in Japanese. For designated technolo-
gies, see infra app. D, the BOJ and appropriate ministries may also request a complete copy of the
technology induction contract. Interview with an official of the Foreign Department, Bank of Japan,
in Tokyo (July 1985).
91 Interview with K. Tsuchiya, Assistant Advisor, Foreign Department, Bank of Japan, in To-
kyo (July 1985) [hereinafter Tsuchiya interview]. See also Smith, supra note 11, at 469-71.
92 Law professor interview, supra note 74.
93 Tsuchiya interview, supra note 91.
94 Japanese attorney interview, supra note 13.
95 See supra note 90 for a description of the kind of information that must be provided.
96 Japanese attorney interview, supra note 13.
97 Tsuchiya interview, supra note 91.
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possess some of the required information such as number of employees,
the total capital possessed by the parties involved, or other information,
such as the registered patent numbers of the technology in other coun-
tries.98 Providing such information, while criticized as extremely bur-
densome by some,99 requires little more than a couple of phone calls to
the relevant persons. 100
In the case of designated technologies, the potential for delay is
much greater. 10' The BOJ will scrutinize the application forms more
closely. 102 It is likely that the BOJ will require a more concrete and
explicit description of the type of technology involved."0 3 Furthermore,
in the case of designated technologies, the parties may have to consult
with or provide information to the appropriate ministries." 0 MITI has
specifically stated that, if information sufficient for it to make an in-
formed opinion is not provided, MITI will refuse to accept formally the
notification application. 05 If MITI or another appropriate ministry does
not formally accept the notification application, the BOJ, which simply
acts as a madoguchi (window) for communication between the applicants
and the appropriate ministries, will refuse to accept formally the notifica-
tion application. 06 Such cases, while infrequent, have been known to
occur.'0 7 This is especially true with the first five of the twelve desig-
nated technologies: aircraft, arms, gunpowder, atomic energy, and space
development. 108
The result of this situation is that the appropriate ministry will tele-
phone the submitting parties and request the provision of additional in-
formation or possibly a meeting to discuss the particular technology
98 Id.
99 Japanese attorney interview, supra note 13.
100 Law professor interview, supra note 74.
101 See infra app. D for a list of designated technologies.
102 Tsuchiya interview, supra note 91.
103 Id.
104 Id. Before submitting formal notification forms, the parties may need to consult with the
appropriate persons at the BOJ, the appropriate ministry, and, in some cases, the parties may need to
submit prenotification applications to inform and prepare the BOJ and other ministries for the for-
mal notification to come later.
105 Interview with M. Mikami, et al., Office for the Promotion of Foreign Investment in Japan,
MITI, in Tokyo (Aug. 1985). Several MITI officials were quite adamant, when pressed, about this
position. The author questioned whether the quality of this information was an important issue at
all given the pro forma nature of the review of the notification forms. The officials insisted that the
information must be specific and accurate with designated technologies.
106 Tsuchiya interview, supra note 91.
107 Id.
108 Noburu interview, supra note 74. These five are the most closely scrutinized of all technolo-




transfer. 10 9 This procedure may only require several weeks or, at the
most, a month or two.110 Even in this worst case scenario, therefore,
delays are likely to be minimal.
Moreover, in practice, significant prenotification delays are unlikely
to occur with any frequency. First, as described earlier, the application
procedures are relatively simple."1 Second, the Japanese party or an ex-
perienced Japanese law firm is likely to submit the notification forms for
the foreign party." 2 Consequently, none of the nightmares that foreign
business executives may conjure up about dealing in Japanese with obsti-
nate Japanese bureaucrats are likely to occur in reality. Their proxies,
the Japanese business executives and lawyers, are likely to have the nec-
essary experience to make sure that the forms are properly submitted by
ensuring that the persons submitting the forms consult properly with the
BOJ and the appropriate ministry. They are also likely to have the nec-
essary connections with government agencies to iron out particular
problems that may occur.113
The second kind of potential delay is that of postnotification. While
the potential for delays of four to five months are legally possible under
the terms of the new FECL,114 such a situation has never been the
case."' All of the important screening work is done prior to the formal
acceptance of the notification forms." 6 In the case of nondesignated
technologies, execution of the TIC may begin the day after the formal
acceptance of the notification." 7 In the case of designated technologies,
the parties are required to wait two weeks before proceeding with the
execution of the contract." 8 According to the BOJ, this two-week pe-
riod is never waived if a designated technology is involved, regardless of
the exigencies of the situation. 119
In sum, with designated technologies, there is a possibility of preno-
tification delay and a required period of nonperformance for two weeks
after formal acceptance of the notification. With nondesignated technol-
ogies, however, without a serious blunder on the part of the submitting
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 See supra note 92.
112 Interview with the legal department manager of a major Japanese company, in Tokyo (Aug.
1985)[hereinafter Legal department manager interview].
113 Id.
114 See infra app. G.
115 Noburu interview, supra note 74.
116 Id.
117 See infra app. H.
18 Id.
119 Tsuchiya interview, supra note 91.
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party, the application is likely to be accepted at once, with performance
on the contract permitted the very next day.
2. Restrictive Effect of Formal Notification Procedure
This section deals with the restrictive effect of the required notifica-
tion procedure. This procedure consists of filing notification forms with
the BOJ and the appropriate ministry and the ministry's formal accept-
ance of the forms.' 20 The parties must obtain the requisite information,
properly fill in the information, consult with the appropriate ministry
when necessary, and submit the forms to the BOJ. 121 As described ear-
lier, this is not a particularly difficult process, for it is commonly accom-
plished by paralegals at law firms and non-lawyers in a business firm.'22
However, some critics of the notification requirement claim, that, for
various reasons, there is a significant restrictive effect resulting from the
mere existence of a notification requirement.' 23
First, the critics claim that obtaining all of the required information
for the application forms is a difficult and troublesome task. 24 Among
the most difficult pieces of information are the technical description of
the type of technology involved, the patent or trademark number if rele-
vant, and numerous bits of information about the foreign firm. Although
the process of obtaining information may require some effort, it cannot
be said to have a truly restrictive effect on the execution of the great
majority of TICs.' 25 If the TIC is of so little commercial value that the
requirement of obtaining certain information and providing it to the Jap-
anese government will effectively restrict its execution, then such a TIC
would probably be too trivial for consideration.
The same critics may counter, however, that the relative simplicity
of the present notification procedures is not important, rather it is the
foreign firm's perception-or misperception-of the difficulty of the noti-
fication procedures.' 26 Based on past experience, or hearsay concerning
past procedures, foreign firms may be deterred from licensing technol-
ogy.' 27 This argument seems to point more to a deficiency in the knowl-
120 It seems ironic that TIC parties must persuade a government agency to accept a notification
application, but this is precisely what occurs here. If the forms are not in appropriate condition, the
BOJ will not accept them and the waiting period for nonperformance will not begin to expire. Id.
121 See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
122 Interview with a Japanese attorney, in Tokyo (June 1985).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Law professor interview, supra note 74.





edge of the foreign firms rather than a problem with Japanese investment
laws.
In the past, some commentators have claimed that, because of the
strict regulation of legal activities in Japan by the government, and be-
cause of the difficulty of the Japanese language, foreign firms are handi-
capped in their attempts to do business in Japan. 128 This argument may
have some applicability with more complicated procedures or with busi-
ness ventures in which it is difficult to obtain the help and advice of a
Japanese company. This will probably not be a problem, however, with
notification procedures under the new FECL. 29 With FECL notifica-
tion, in most cases, the notification is handled by the Japanese party to
the TIC.'30 And even if it is not, there is a sufficient supply of interna-
tional law firms in Tokyo willing and very able to handle such proce-
dures.' Overall, this process is simple and often handled by the
Japanese party, so the cost of legal services to fulfill the notification pro-
cedure should not be a significant barrier to TIC execution.
3. Disclosure of Information Obtained through Notification Procedures
Under Japan's FECL
In the case of a TIC involving know-how or business expertise, the
foreign party's fear of disclosure by the Japanese government could serve
conceivably as a deterrent to the execution of TICs.132 In the course of
this research, this author asked numerous government, legal, and busi-
ness leaders about the possibility of secret and illegal disclosure of trade
secrets by the BOJ or the appropriate ministry to a Japanese business
firm. The responses were either that such is never the case and, even if it
were, it would be illegal and subject that particular official to discharge
and possible criminal prosecution. 133 Such disclaimers do not disprove
the possibility of industrial espionage involving Japanese governmental
organs, and subsequent to the case involving Hitachi espionage of IBM,
United States firms are likely to be wary of the possibility of information
leaks from government ministries to Japanese firms. 134 Even if there
were proven examples of such illicit disclosure of information obtained
128 Interview with a United States attorney at the Tokyo affiliate of a large United States law firm,
in Tokyo (June 1985)[hereinafter United States attorney interview].
129 Law professor interview, supra note 74.
130 Legal department manager interview, supra note 112.
131 Law professor interview, supra note 74.
132 Id. This kind of worry would probably not exist for TICs involving patents, utility models, or
trademarks, which are already available to public knowledge.
133 Noburn interview, supra note 74.
134 United States attorney interview, supra note 128.
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through the TIC notification procedures, it is unlikely that the informa-
tion will be of much importance to another business firm. As described
earlier, the information included on the application forms is likely to be
very general, especially in the case of know-how.' 35
MITI, the MOF, and the Science and Technology Agency do re-
lease general statistics to the public regarding the number and type of
TICs for a particular year. This information can be helpful to the gov-
ernment as well as other business firms.' 3 6 (The United States govern-
ment may be well-advised to provide somehow for a means to discover
the same statistics for the United States.) The mere fact that this infor-
mation is published, however, will not seem to have a restrictive effect on
the execution of TICs. On the contrary, such information may prompt
competitors of firms who have completed TICs to inquire with the for-
eign firm about a similar licensing agreement for itself.' 37
4. Effect of FECL Regulations on the Bargaining Power of the
Respective Parties
This section is closely related to the next section which relates to
administrative guidance under the new FECL. In a sense, the effects of
formal and informal enforcement of the FECL on the bargaining power
of the parties may be a subset of the effects of the same resulting from
administrative guidance. The first way in which FECL enforcement
could affect the bargaining power of the parties is by a disparate provi-
sion of governmental expertise and information to the respective parties.
This clearly occurred under the old FIL/FECL regime.'38 The close ties
between Japanese business and government, and the desire of the govern-
ment to aid businesses resulted in the provision of large amounts of infor-
mation to the Japanese party and almost no information to the foreign
party. 139 In the days when so much of the important operating proce-
dures were informal and unwritten, a flow of information to and from
the government was crucial.
Given that disparities in information provision existed under the old
135 Tsuchiya interview, supra note 91.
136 Law professor interview, supra note 74.
137 One possible explanation for the great disparity in the number of TICs from the United States
to Japan as compared to the reverse is the competitive, almost paranoiac attempts of Japanese firms
to license technology when they perceive one of their competitors to have access to the same technol-
ogy. For example, Fujitsu, NEC, and Mitsubishi may each deem it necessary to license a certain
software product. In these cases of potential double or triple licensing of a certain technology, the
wide dissemination of information regarding TICs through government reports would seem to be
beneficial to the foreign licensors contemplating the sale of the technology.




regime, this Comment will now consider whether these practices still ex-
ist under the new FECL. It appears that the Japanese government has
continued to cooperate closely with Japanese companies. The fifth gener-
ation computer program is a good example of such cooperation in a high-
technology industry, the Voluntary Restraint Agreement with
automobiles14 is a good example in the manufacturing sector, and gov-
ernment promotion and protection of agriculture and leather producers
are examples in the primary sector. While this general cooperation con-
tinues to exist in various modes, the key question is whether such cooper-
ation continues to exist pursuant to TICs.
Although the research conducted pursuant to this topic is not con-
clusive on the subject of bargaining power, the following generalizations
can be based on the research conducted. First, the conspicuous two-to-
one bargaining situation with Japanese government and the Japanese li-
censee pitted against the foreign licensor in TIC negotiation is virtually
nonexistent today. 141 As to specific TIC terms, the Japanese government
is no longer the trusted information source that it once was. 142 Nor does
the threat of its disapproval of TIC terms carry the weight that it once
did. 143 In fact, with today's numerous trade problems including the huge
United States trade deficit with Japan, it seems likely that the complaints
of a foreign party could have greater or equal clout to that of a Japanese
party.'" Thus, in terms of conspicuous advice provided by the Japanese
government to Japanese parties with the implicit purpose of gaining ad-
vantages over foreign parties in a bargaining situation, this type of effect
on bargaining power is virtually nonexistent.
The more difficult question, however, is whether Japanese firms, be-
140 JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION, JAPAN HANDBOOK (1985).
141 Noburu interview, supra note 74.
142 Law professor interview, supra note 74. Well-oiled information channels surely continue to
exist between Japanese bureaucrats and business firms, but it is unlikely that Japanese bureaucrats
will provide the provision-by-provision analysis of the technical and economic feasibility and fairness
of TICs to Japanese firms that they once did. One reason for this change is that it is now more
difficult for ministry officials to stay up with all of the rapid technological development in various
fields. Interview with MITI official, in Tokyo (July 1985). Another reason is that, with the increase
in the number of TICs handled by the ministries, the time that can be devoted to any single one has
been reduced. Id. Finally some Japanese ministries, particularly MITI, now no longer have the
antiforeign bias that they once had. Id. This may be in order to assuage criticism from the United
States or arising from a perceived decrease in the need for the protection of Japanese companies.
Most large Japanese companies have such large and well-informed legal and engineering personnel
that it would be difficult to imagine MITI or some other ministry has very significant legal or techni-
cal information that these firms now do not have. Interview with the Director of the Engineering
Department of a major Japanese steel company, in Tokyo (Aug. 1985).
143 Id.
144 This may be especially true subsequent to the creation of the trade ombudsman whose chief
function is to hear complaints from foreign parties seeking to conduct business in Japan.
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cause of the network of connections, or simply because they are domestic
firms, are able to obtain significant amounts of technical, commercial,
and legal information from Japanese governmental ministries that are
unavailable to foreign firms. Both MITI and the BOJ claimed to lack the
technical expertise to provide helpful advice.145 While this claim may be
valid for persons who perform the pro forma checking of FECL reports
involving nondesignated technologies, MITI and the MOF provide ex-
pert advice to the parties involved in most types of TICs.146 Yet, while
the ministries probably have the capability to provide relevant technical
advice on TICs, for most large Japanese companies that are parties to the
great majority of international TICs, such information is not necessary
because equally qualified technical experts exist within their own compa-
nies.147 Commercial advice is a similar story; although the ministries
might have significant technical expertise, equal or greater expertise may
likely exist within the large Japanese company.' 48 Legal advice is also
similar. The ministries have the greatest legal expertise, because they are
administering the notification procedures. However, since the procedures
are now quite simple and because most large or medium-sized businesses
have their own legal experts or have ready access to attorneys, attempts
to obtain particular legal advice probably would not aid in the negotia-
tion of TIC terms. 4 9 In sum, while in the past, the Japanese govern-
ment, through the unilateral provision of technical, commercial, and
legal information, significantly aided the Japanese party in the process of
negotiating and forming a TIC, today, because most of the requisite ex-
pertise exists within the Japanese firms or is readily accessible to them
through private means, differential provision of information can no
longer be said to significantly affect the bargaining of TIC parties.
The second way in which the Japanese government has affected the
bargaining power of TIC parties in the past was through the threat of
formal and informal sanctions against the foreign parties. This threat of
sanctions may occur during the TIC negotiation or after formation of the
terms of the TIC between the time the TIC parties first submit the notifi-
cation forms to the BOJ and when the BOJ officially accepts the
notification.
In the past the threat of formal or informal sanctions detrimentally
145 Noburu interview, supra note 74; Tsuchiya interview, supra note 91.
146 Interview with the Assistant General Manager of the Engineering, Sales, and Consulting De-
partment of a major Japanese steel company, in Tokyo (Aug. 1985).





affected the bargaining power of the foreign party to a TIC.15 Such
threats were thought necessary to equalize the bargaining power of the
licensee and licensor. 51 However, judging from the extensive research
conducted by the author in Tokyo, such threats of sanctions pursuant to
the FECL are now virtually nonexistent. 152 There are two interrelated
reasons for such a dramatic turnaround. With the equalization of the
relative economic strength and accompanying bargaining power of the
Japanese and foreign parties, such attempts to aid the Japanese party
were no longer necessary.1 53 In fact, not only were such threats no
longer necessary, but they were no longer acceptable to Japan's trading
partners.1 54 Second, as a result of the combined factors of the decreasing
need for government assistance in TIC formation and increasing pressure
from foreign nations for TIC law liberalization, the Diet amended the
FECL significantly in 1979. Previously, the FIL/FECL regime operated
on the "negative principle" that prohibited all transactions without spe-
cific ministry permission.155 The new FECL, however, operates on the
"positive principle" that all transactions are permitted except those spe-
cifically prohibited. 56 Under the "positive principle," administrative
guidance which would significantly affect the bargaining power of the
respective parties has been limited significantly. This principle elimi-
nated the most frequently used sanction under the FECL which was to
sit on the application without taking any action.1 57 Under the new
FECL, the ministries must take the step of positively prohibiting the
transaction and provide reasons for such a prohibition in order to achieve
the same result. Such a step is much more difficult both administratively
and politically. 158 In sum, the threat of the imposition of sanctions as a
device to help the bargaining power of the Japanese party to a TIC is
virtually nonexistent for both international economic and legal reasons.
5. Effect on TIC Terms of Administrative Guidance Pursuant to the
FECL
Most of the effects of the execution of administrative guidance under
150 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
151 Interview with attorney, in Tokyo (June 1985).
152 Smith, supra note 11, at 462.
153 For a list of the TICs for 1983, see SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1. This list
indicates that, in the great majority of cases, the foreign licensors now have less economic power
than the Japanese licensees.
154 Seesupra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
155 Smith, supra note 11, at 421.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Noburu interview, supra note 74.
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the new FECL have already been mentioned.159 As the result of infor-
mal governmental action, there is a possibility of some time delay occur-
ring in the execution of a TIC. There is also a potential for government
action which would affect the bargaining power of the respective parties.
However, now that the government plays a greatly decreased role in
TICs, it is very unlikely that such types of administrative guidance will
adversely affect the foreign party. The most likely type of administrative
guidance, however, will occur between the time when the parties present
the notification forms to the BOJ and when the BOJ formally accepts
notification. Before the submission, barring extraordinary circum-
stances, the ministries will know little about the proposed transaction.
Except for technology transfers involving extraordinary industries such
as nuclear energy, weapons, or space, the ministries are unlikely to be
concerned at all with the proposed transaction until the notification sub-
mission with the BOJ."6° After the BOJ formally accepts the notifica-
tion, the ministries have no legal authority or precedent for intervening
in the transaction.16' Thus, the only time that significant administrative
guidance takes place under the new FECL is during this interim period.
With nondesignated technologies, even during the period between
notification submission and formal acceptance of notification, the minis-
tries are unlikely to pursue any types of administrative guidance.162
With designated technologies, some type of administrative action is more
likely. MITI has stated specifically that it will refuse to accept the sub-
mission of notification forms that provide inadequate information for it
to make a rational decision.163 The problem of adequate information is,
however, not as difficult as it may sound. MITI officials claim that with
the first five designated technologies, except in the case of conspicuous
inadequacies, they will approve the applications pro forma without sig-
nificant consideration of the technical content.' 64 In the case of the first
five designated technologies, the consideration is, of necessity, much
more careful. These are technologies, however, that one would naturally
assume the government to regulate more strictly. The United States gov-
ernment similarly regulates the import and export of most of these tech-
nologies through one agency or another. 165 Thus, while some regulation
is likely (and in Japan this regulation will probably take the form of ad-
159 For a description of administrative guidance in the Japanese context, see supra note 61.
160 Noburu interview, supra note 74.
161 Tsuchiya interview, supra note 91.
162 See Smith, supra note 11, at 470-75.
163 Id. at 471; Noburu interview, supra note 74.
164 Id.
165 UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE STUDY GROUP: PROGRESS REPORT 52-53 (1984).
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ministrative guidance), such regulation is not likely to be contrary to the
expectations of the parties. Indeed, such regulation seems to be of the
very nature a governmental function.
6. Effect of FECL on Cross-Licensing Arrangements
In certain fields, an international licensing agreement in which the
Japanese party agrees to grant back a license to certain technology to the
foreign party will probably be deemed a service transaction requiring a
license from MITI or the MOF.'66 The statute grants to the competent
ministry the authority to require a prior license for service transactions
"considered to be obstructive to the faithful performance of treaties.. .or
the maintenance of international peace and security." '167 MITI, for ex-
ample, has designated about 150 strategic items that require a prior li-
cense for export, including numerous important high-technology items
such as diodes, transistors, integrated circuits, other semiconductor
products, and electronic computers.168 Of these 150 items, only twenty-
three are nuclear or defense related.'69 Alternatively, if, as part of the
international licensing agreement, the Japanese party agrees to sell cer-
tain strategic or high-technology goods to the foreign party, a license
from the relevant ministry will be required.' 70
Thus, the outward flow of certain technologies and goods that is
frequently involved in contemporary TICs into Japan will be controlled
by prior licenses. Cross-licensing agreements must be structured not
only so the Japanese government will accept the prior report regarding
the inflow of technology, but also so the Japanese government will issue a
license for the export of the relevant good or service. 17 1 In this way, the
emphasis has shifted from the regulation of the import of technology to
the export of technology. Therefore, it is difficult to assert that the
amendment of the FECL has had much effect in liberalizing the execu-
tion of cross-licenses. Yet, bureaucratic practices regarding cross-
licenses as well as one-way TICs have been liberalized so that conditions
for foreign licensors have improved in both cases. Be that as it may, the
prevailing opinion among legal practitioners in Japan is that, concerning
cross-license agreements, the Japanese government still exerts a signifi-
cant amount of control that can be used by the Japanese party to extract
favorable contract terms.
166 FECL art. 25.
167 Id.
168 Sharp, supra note 12, at 245.
169 Id.
170 Export Trade Control Order, Cabinet Order No. 378 (Dec. 1, 1984).
171 Sharp, supra note 12, at 246.
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III. TIC REGULATION UNDER THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW
A. Introduction
The Japanese AML, 1 72 enacted in 1947, was the first permanent law
in Japanese history whose purpose was to promote free and fair competi-
tion. 17 3 It was patterned after the antitrust laws of the United States,
adopting into a single statute, principles from the Sherman Act, the Clay-
ton Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Robinson-Patman
Act. 174 Unlike United States antitrust laws, the Japanese law is essen-
tially an administrative law enforced by government bureaucrats chiefly
through private consultation with the parties.1 75 The declared purpose
of the AML states:
This Act, by prohibiting private monopolization, unreasonable restraint of
trade and unfair business practices, by preventing the excessive concentra-
tion of power over enterprises and by excluding undue restriction of pro-
duction, sale, price, and technology through combination or agreement, and
all other unreasonable restraint of business activities, aims to promote free
and fair competition, to stimulate the initiative of entrepreneurs, to en-
courage business activities of enterprises, to heighten the level of employ-
ment and people's income, and thereby to promote the democratic and
wholesome development of the national economy as well as to assure the
interest of the general consumer. 176
The original 1947 AML was stricter than United States antitrust
laws, but, in order to make the AML facilitate the rebuilding of the Japa-
nese economy, it was amended several times. 177 The 1949 amendment
eased the control on "intercorporate stockholding and interlocking direc-
torates among noncompetitive companies."' 178 The 1953 amendment,
passed a year after the end of the occupation period, provided certain
exemptions for cartels for depressed industries and cartel agreements
contemplating the rationalization of enterprises. 179
Article 6, section 1 of the AML prohibits businesses from entering
into international agreements containing terms constituting an unreason-
able restraint of trade or unfair trade practice. 180 Section 2 of the same
172 AML, supra note 7.
173 M. ARIGA, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AGREEMENTS UNDER THE JAPA-
NESE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW 278 (1975).
174 Id. at 279.
175 Higgins, supra note 15, at 45.
176 AML § 1.
177 M. ARIGA, supra note 173, at 279.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Article 2 of the AML defines these important terms. The phrase futd na torihiki seigen (un-
reasonable restraint of trade) refers to:
such business activities, by which any entrepreneurs by contract, agreement, or any other con-
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article provides that, when a firm has concluded an international agree-
ment, the company must fie a report of the agreement with the FTC
within thirty days. 81 Unlike the report required under the FECL, the
AML report is filed after the conclusion of the agreement and only by the
Japanese party. This after-the-fact system was adopted with the idea that
the anticompetitive effects of an agreement would be more readily appar-
ent at a stage shortly after the conclusion of the agreement. 182 The FTC,
however, has not followed through with this policy. Instead of investi-
gating closely the anticompetitive effects of an agreement, the FTC
mechanically reviews the form of the text of an agreement to ascertain
whether certain prohibited terms have been included.'83 If the FTC de-
termines that such provisions exist, it may order the deletion of the of-
fending provisions or take other necessary measures.1 84  In practice,
however, subsequent to the 1953 amendment to the AML, the FTC has
taken no formal action against offending parties, but has resorted to ad-
ministrative guidance, requesting that the parties delete the offending
provisions. 185
certed activities mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in such a manner as to fix,
maintain, or enhance prices, or to limit production, technology, products, facilities, or custom-
ers or suppliers, thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of com-
petition in any particular field of trade.
AML art. 2.
The phrase fukosei na torihikihhF (unfair business practices) means:
any act coming under any one of the following items, which tends to impede fair competition
and which is designated by the Fair Trade Commission to: (i) unreasonably discriminate against
other entrepreneurs; (ii) unreasonably induce or coerce customers of a competitor to deal with
oneself; (iv) trade with another party on such conditions as will restrict unreasonably the busi-
ness activities of the said party; (v) deal with another party by unwarranted use of one's bar-
gaining position; (vi) unjustly interfere with a transaction between an entrepreneur who
competes in Japan with oneself or the company of which oneself is the stockholder or an officer
and his customers, or, in case such entrepreneur is a company, unjustly induce, instigate, or
coerce a stockholder or an officer of such company to act against the interest of such company.
Id.
181 The operative provision of the AML regarding international TICs is found in Chapter II
(Private Monopolization and Undue Restraint of Trade), art. 6 (International Agreements).
1. No entrepreneur shall enter into an international agreement or an international con-
tract which contains therein such matters as constitute undue restraint of trade or unfair busi-
ness practices.
2. In accordance with the rules of the Fair Trade Commission, any entrepreneur who has
concluded an international agreement or an international contract (provided only that such
agreement or contract is of a kind designated by the Rules of the Fair Trade Commission as
considered likely to contain matters that may constitue undue restraint of trade or unfair busi-
ness practices) shall file a report to that effect, together with a copy of such agreement or con-
tract (in the case of a verbal agreement or contract, a document indicating the substance
thereof) with the Fair Trade Commission within thirty days after the day of such conclusion.
AML art. 6, §§ 1-2.
182 Shibuya, supra note 12, at 19.
183 Id. For this reason, the view that the current after-the-fact reporting system should be
changed to a before-the-fact system seems quite persuasive.
184 AML art. 7, § 1.
185 Shibuya, supra note 12, at 21.
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The exercise of industrial property rights is exempted from AML
application by section 23, which provides that "[t]he provisions of this
Act shall not apply to acts recognizable as the exercise of rights under
the Copyright Act, the Patent Act, the Utility Model Act, the Design
Act, and the Trademark Act." '86 Section 100, however, provides for the
revocation of a patent right that has been misused in violation of the
provisions of the AML. 187
B. The Fair Trade Commission
The AML is administered and enforced by the FTC, which was es-
tablished by the provisions of the AML.18 The FTC is part of the prime
minister's office, but maintains complete independence in the perform-
ance of its duties.'89 The FTC consists of five commissioners with the
chairperson included.1 90 The commissioners are appointed by the prime
minister for five-year terms. 91 The general functions of the FTC are to:
1) investigate suspected violations of the AML (on its own authority or
upon the complaint of a member of the public) and render decisions in
these cases; 192 2) designate unfair practices; 9 3 3) receive reports or notifi-
cations; 194 and 4) grant approval to depression or rationalization
cartels. 195
The FTC function specifically related to TICs is to receive the notifi-
cation report of the Japanese party to an international TIC and review
the validity in terms of the AML of the terms of the TIC.196 If the FTC
186 AML § 23.
187 For substantive provisions of the AML, see supra note 181 and infra note 196. See also FTC
guidelines.
188 AML § 27(1).
189 M. ARIGA, supra note 173, at 280.
190 AML § 29(1).
191 AML § 29(2).
192 AML §§ 45-61.
193 AML §§ 71-72.
194 AML § 8.
195 AML § 24.
196 Details of the notification procedure are provided by the Regulation Concerning the Report-
ing of International Agreements, FTC Regulation No. 1, 1971. Form 1, which is used with TICs,
requires disclosure of the following information: 1) matters concerning the reporting party (i.e., the
Japanese firm); 2) matters concerning the foreign party; 3) matters concerning the conclusion of the
agreement; 4) the contents of the agreement; and 5) other relevant information. Category 4 regard-
ing the contents of the agreement requires description of the following important contract terms: 1)
technology involved; 2) types of industrial property; 3) types of technical assistance; 4) manufactur-
ing territory; 5) sales territory; 6) restrictions on sale price or quantity; 7) restrictions on sale of
competing products or use of competing technology; 8) restrictions on the raw material source; 9)
restrictions on the quality of raw materials, parts, or products; 10) restrictions on manufacture or
sale; 11) obligations to disclose improvement technology; 12) ownership of patents or other in-
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determines that a particular term in the TIC constitutes a "private mo-
nopoly," "unreasonable restraint," or "unfair trade practice," the FTC
will initially request a voluntary deletion of such a term through the use
of administrative guidance. 19 7 If the Japanese party refuses to accept
such a request, the FTC will next issue an official recommendation which
it strongly urges the Japanese party to accept.1 98 If the formal recom-
mendation is also refused, the FTC will start formal trial procedures to
delete the allegedly violative term.199 The decision of this trial may be
appealed before the Tokyo High Court.2"
In an important case regarding the FTC formal recommendation to
delete a violative term, the foreign party, Novo Industries, filed suit de-
manding the cancellation of such a recommendation addressed to the
Japanese party to the contract, Amano Pharmaceutical Company.201
The Supreme Court upheld the Tokyo High Court decision to deny such
a claim because Novo, obtaining no legal benefit from such a recommen-
dation, had no standing to sue.202 The rationale of the Supreme Court
was that such a recommendation can be enforced only when the Japanese
party accepts the recommendation.20 3 Since the acceptance of the rec-
ommendation is wholly dependent upon the will of the Japanese party, it
was held not to have a binding effect on a third party.
C. FTC Guidelines
In order to distinguish more clearly between the proper exercise of a
patent right and an illegal unfair trade practice, the FTC issued the An-
timonopoly Act Guidelines for International Licensing Agreements.
Item I of these guidelines, noted below, presents nine types of restrictive
clauses which the FTC finds categorically illegal.
1) To restrict the area to which the licensee may export the goods
covered by patent rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as "patented goods").
However, cases coming under a, b, or c listed below are excluded:
tangibles; 13) territory for use of assigned improvement technology; 14) period to use assigned im-
provement technology; 15) payment for the assignment or license of improvement technology; 16)
other restrictions on improvement technology; 17) calculation of consideration for technology assist-
ance; 18) licensing of trademarks; 19) causes of contract termination; 20) arbitration clauses; and 21)
governing law and jurisdiction of the contract.




201 Novo Industri A/S v. FTC, 22 Gyosei reishi 761, 17 Kotori Shintekishu, 4 Kokusaitorihiki
hanreishu 211 (Tokyo High Court, May 19, 1971).
202 Novo Industri A/S v. FTC, Hanrei Jiho (No. 800)(35 Sup. Ct., Nov. 28, 1975).
203 Id.
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a) In case the licensor has patent rights, etc., which have been reg-
istered in the area to which the licensee's export is restricted (hereinafter
referred to as the "restricted area");
b) In case the licensor is selling patented goods in the restricted
area in one's normal business;
c) In case the licensor has granted to a third party an exclusive
license to sell in the restricted area.
2) To restrict the licensee's export prices or quantities of patented
goods, or to make it obligatory for the licensee to export patented goods
through the licensor or a person designated by the licensor. However, such
cases are excluded where the licensor grants license to export to the area
coming under either of the preceding a, b, or c and the said restrictions or
obligations imposed are of reasonable scope.
3) To restrict the licensee from manufacturing, using, or selling
goods and/or employing technology which is in competition with the Hi-
censed subject. However, such cases are excluded where the licensor grants
an exclusive license and imposes no restriction of goods already being man-
ufactured, used, or sold or technology already being utilized by the licensee.
4) To make it obligatory for the licensee to purchase raw materials,
parts, etc., from the licensor or a person designated by the licensor.
5) To make it obligatory for the licensee to sell patented goods
through the licensor or a person designated by the licensor.
6) To restrict the resale prices of patented goods in Japan.
7) To make it obligatory for the licensee to inform the licensor of
knowledge or experience newly obtained regarding the licensed technology,
or to assign the rights with respect to an improved or applied invention by
the licensee to the licensor or to grant the licensor thereon. However, such
cases are excluded where the licensor bears similar obligations and the obli-
gations of both parties are equally balanced in substance.
8) To charge royalties on goods which do not utilize licensed
technology.
9) To restrict the quality of raw materials, parts, etc., or of patented
goods. However, such cases are excluded where such restrictions are neces-
sary to maintain the credibility of the registered trademark or to insure the
effectiveness of the licensed technology.2 4
Item III of the same guidelines lists the following types of license
restrictions which the FTC considers to within the proper exercise of
industrial fights.
1) To grant license to manufacture, use, sell, etc., separately;
2) To grant license for a limited period within the life of patent
rights, etc., or for a limited area within the whole area covered by patent
rights, etc.;
3) To restrict the manufacture of patented goods to a limited field of
technology or to restrict the sale thereof to a limited field of sales;
204 Fair Trade Commission, Criteria for Decisions on International Contracts for Technological
Introduction (1968)[hereinafter FTC Criteria].
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4) To restrict the use of patented processes to a limited field of tech-
nology; and
5) To restrict the amount of output or the amount of sales of pat-
ented goods or to restrict the frequency of the use of patented processes.20 5
There are three areas under these guidelines that have historically
presented foreign licensors with the most trouble. First, in grant-back
license provisions, which may be considered a subset of the larger group
of general cross-licensing agreements, the FTC approach has been ini-
tially to prohibit such provisions except for those that meet the guide-
lines' exclusion-when "the obligations of both parties are equally
balanced."20 6 This has been interpreted to mean that a foreign licensor
will have to grant improvements to the Japanese licensee if it wishes to
receive the same from the Japanese party.20 7 Merely agreeing to disclose
the existence of technological improvements may well prove insufficient
to the FTC. For the foreign licensor, this required mutuality in grant-
back obligations can be a serious obstacle to proceeding with the
agreement.
Second, noncompetition provisions, such as grant-back license pro-
visions, are initially prohibited by the FTC. 08 For the foreign licensor
unwilling to grant an exclusive status to the Japanese party, the ban is
absolute.2 09 In addition, the enforceability of noncompetition provisions
will likely last only as long as the foreign licensor continues to grant an
exclusive status to the Japanese licensee.
Finally, quality control provisions are permitted only to "maintain
the credibility of the registered trademark or to ensure the effectiveness
for the licensed technology." 10 Drafting seems to be the key to avoiding
FTC objections in this respect.2 11 Licensors should be careful to use neu-
tral-sounding language with respect to quality control requirements for
the Japanese licensee. If the licensor uses language that seems to require
a very high standard of quality control, it may raise an FTC objection.
D. Effects of FTC Regulation on the Formation of TICs in Japan
As has been noted earlier, not since 1953 has the FTC used formal
adjudicatory procedures to mandate a modification or cancellation of a
205 Id. at item III.
206 Id. art. 1(7).
207 Higgins, supra note 15, at 51.
208 See FTC Criteria, supra note 204, art. 1(6). Noncompetition provisions include those restrict-
ing sublicensing or distributorship arrangements.
209 Higgins, supra note 15, at 55.
210 See FIC Criteria, supra note 204, art. 1(9).
211 Higgins, supra note 15, at 60.
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TIC.2 12 The FTC has continued, however, to make extensive use of in-
formal guidance to require TIC modification or cancellation if the TIC
contains provisions violative of the AML or its guidelines.21 Listed be-
low is a summary of the type of administrative guidance exercised by the
FTC in 1983 and the number of cases.2 14
1) Restrictions on improved technology 66 cases
2) Restrictions on dealing in competing goods 29 cases
3) Restrictions on seller's supplying licensee with
raw materials, parts, etc. 2 cases
4) Customer restrictions 5 cases
5) Restrictions on resale price 1 case
6) Suppression of parallel imports 3 cases
7) Restrictions on advertising 12 cases
This summary is quite representative of historic trends in the area of
administrative guidance.215 It is clear that the FTC has and continues to
exert a substantial amount of influence in the formation and execution of
licensing agreements.216 It is also readily apparent that in each of these
cases the ostensible beneficiary of such informal FTC action was the Jap-
anese licensee. In each of these categories, the foreign licensor had in-
cluded in the agreement some type of restrictive clause as to the Japanese
licensee's use of the particular technology which the FTC requested be
changed.
The next question is: To what extent does this informal guidance
work to the detriment of the foreign licensor? It is clear that the influ-
ence of the AML and the FTC reaches much deeper than the number of
cases of reported informal guidance. 2 7 During negotiations between the
foreign licensor and the Japanese licensee, if the licensor attempts to in-
clude any terms in the agreement that may violate the AML and its
guidelines, the Japanese party will quickly inform the licensor that such a
term must be stricken because it is illegal under Japanese law.218 One
wonders whether the foreign party really has adequate knowledge be-
cause, in many cases, the foreign party will not challenge the judgement
212 See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
213 See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
214 Kjseitorihikiinkai Nenjihikoku, Dokusenkinshihakusho, Kisei torihikiinkaihen (Showa
59)(FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL 1984) 130. Note that the FTC and
the Science and Technology Agency have different methods for the computation of TIC statistics.
215 Id.
216 There has been some suggestion that the FTC is quite rigorous in its enforcement of restrictive
provisions relating to international licensing agreements while not being quite lenient in its enforce-
ment of domestic practices that constitute unreasonable restraints of trade or monopolization. D.
HENDERSON, supra note 18, at 180.




of the Japanese party. 19
This may not be so important as one might think because of the
reciprocal nature of licensing agreement terms. If the agreement limits
use of the technology to a certain sales area, the royalty rate may be
lowered commensurately or the other party may request the insertion of
a beneficial term in return.220 This is the kind of give and take involved
in licensing agreement negotiations.
In the past, FTC guidance had a greater effect on bargaining
power 22 than it now does. Previously, the FTC often worked closely
with the Japanese licensees in effecting beneficial TIC terms. 2  The Jap-
anese party may have met with FTC officials and determined which TIC
terms should be modified or stricken in order to benefit optimally the
Japanese party. 2 3 Then, pressure could be applied to the foreign party
either by the FTC or by the Japanese party threatened with FTC inter-
vention. 24 Today, it appears that FTC guidance is quite transparent. 25
The FTC mechanically reviews the post-execution report by the Japanese
party to determine whether violative clauses exist. Their determinations
are said to be very predictable and quite fair.22 6 It is also certain that the
FTC continues to enforce vigorously its laws and regulations and that
this enforcement is almost always for the ostensible benefit of the Japa-
nese licensee.
IV. CONCLUSION
The central focus of this Comment was clearly on the FECL as it
related to technology transfers. Since a review of technology transfers in
Japan would not be complete without mentioning the effects of FTC en-
forcement of the AML, mention has been made here. In the past, the
FECL was the chief vehicle for regulating TICs into Japan. The FECL
219 Id. This appears to be another case in which the lack of knowledge of foreign firms regarding
Japan may cause a detriment to their bargaining position. The author questioned numerous engi-
neers and legal personnel involved in licensing negotiations if they ever try to "buffalo" the foreign
party on aspects of Japanese law. They predictably claimed that they would not do such a thing, but
noted that it would be quite possible because of the ignorance of the foreign parties.
220 Id.
221 For discussion of the effect of FECL administrative guidance on TIC terms, see supra notes
160-65. While enforced by different agencies (i.e., the FTC rather than the MOF or MITI), AML
administrative guidance has many of the chracteristics of FECL administrative guidance.
222 Interview with both United States and Japanese attorneys at the Tokyo affiliate of a large
United States law firm, in Tokyo (June 1985).
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Interviews with attorneys in Tokyo (June-July 1985).
226 Id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:197(1987)
regulated imports of technology through approval and, later, notification
requirements. These reporting requirements for technology importation
now seem to play little more than an informational function for the Japa-
nese government. Yet, with cross-licensing arrangements in many fields,
the FECL requires a license from the competent ministry before a tech-
nology can be exported and before the agreement can be executed. Thus,
the focus of regulation has shifted from the import to the export of tech-
nology. This seems a natural result as Japan has become a great eco-
nomic and technological power. It can be said that the FECL has a
much less restrictive and prejudicial effect on the interests of foreign li-
censors than it did in the past. But it cannot be said that the FECL no
longer has any restrictive effect, especially with cross-licensing agree-
ments. Moreover, while FTC enforcement of the AML remains in full
force, it is generally predictable and transparent. Although almost exclu-
sively for the benefit of the Japanese licensee, the FTC is quite mechani-
cal and predictable in its review and informal enforcement of its laws and
regulations.
Since the types of foreign exchange and technology imbalance
problems that prompted the strict regulation of TICs twenty years ago
no longer exist, the motivation for vigorous intervention by the Japanese
government, whether by the BOJ, the MOF, MITI, or the FTC, into the
formation of TICs also no longer exists. In step with this economic and
technological evolution has been an evolution of the Japanese govern-
mental policies regarding TICs. The administrative regulation of TICs
in Japan is no longer the great problem for foreign licensors as it once
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Appendix B
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS IN JAPAN AND UNITED STATES
Billions of
U.S. Dollars
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APPENDIX D
On Prescribing Outward Direct Investments Stipulated by the Min-
ister of Finance, Ministry of Finance Notification No. 118 of the 28th
Day of November, 1980.
1. Aircraft
1) Technology relating to the manufacturing of aircraft;
2) Technology relating to the manufacturing of aircraft parts or
attachments.
2. Arms
1) Technology relating to the manufacturing of arms;
2) Technology relating to the manufacturing of arms parts or arms
accessories;
3) Technology relating to the manufacturing of electronic appli-
ances and installations for military use.
3. Gun powder
Technology relating to the manufacturing of gun powder of all
kinds.
4. Atomic energy
1) Technology relating to the manufacturing or commissioning of
atomic reactors (including nuclear fusion reactors; hereinafter
the same) or parts or attachments or component material
thereof, or turbines for atomic energy, or generators for atomic
energy;
2) Technology relating to the manufacturing or use or retreatment
of nuclear fuels, or to the manufacturing of installations
therefor;
3) Technology relating to the manufacturing or utilization of radi-
oactive ray generators, or to the utilization or treatment of radi-
oactive substance, or to the manufacturing of installations
therefor;
4) Technology relating to the utilization of nuclear reaction ob-
tainable otherwise than by atomic reactors.
5. Space development
1) Technology relating to the manufacturing or use of spacecraft
(excluding weather survey rockets; hereinafter the same) or of
specially designed installations for launching, or guiding and
controlling, pursuing, or utilizing, spacecraft;
2) Technology relating to the manufacturing or operation of spe-




3) Technology relating to the manufacturing or use of spacecraft
propellants or exclusive parts or attachments or materials of 1)
or 2).
6. Electronic computers
1) Technology relating to the manufacturing of electronic com-
puters (including attachments);
2) Technology relating to the manufacturing of electronic com-
puter application installations;
3) Technology relating to the utilization of 1) or 2).
7. Electronic parts for electronic computers of next generation
1) Technology relating to the manufacturing of super large-scale
integrated circuit. Super large-scale integrated circuit means in-
tegrated circuit produced by microminiaturized fabrication
method involving such technologies as electronic beam expo-
sure technique and X ray exposure technique, the single circuit
of which contains the capacity equivalent to that of more than
100,000 pieces of transistors or diodes.
2) Technology relating to the manufacturing of new theoretical el-
ements and new memory elements. New theoretical elements
and new memory elements mean theoretical elements and mem-
ory elements formed on different principles from those of the
known semiconductivity techniques, such as the superconduc-
tive element, microwave semiconductive element, and light
element.
8. Appliances for laser processing and light communication
1) Technology relating to the manufacturing of laser oscillator and
active and passive light element of semiconductor for light
communication.
2) Technology relating to the manufacturing of optical fiber and
light circuit.
9. Innovative materials
1) Technology relating to the manufacturing of amorphous
material.
2) Technology relating to the manufacturing of superconductive
material.
10. Salt electrolysis by non-mercurial method
Technology relating to the production of caustic soda or chlorine or
hydrogen by electrolyzing salt without using mercury.
11. Petroleum production at sea bottom
Technology relating to the construction of devices for recovering pe-
troleum and combustible natural gas from the seabed oil field and
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technology relating to installing and utilizing such devices (limited
to those that can be used at oil fields of 200 meters or more deep),
excluding know-how for the use of platforms.
12. Leather or leather products
1) Technology relating to the manufacturing of leather or leather
products.




Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, Law No. 228,
Dec. 1, 1949, as amended by the Law to Amend a Part of the Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Control Law, Law No. 54 of 1979.
Article 29
1. Any nonresident (including any branch, etc., in Japan of a non-
resident, which shall apply to this Paragraph and Paragraph 3) and resi-
dent who are to conclude an agreement for transfer of the former's
industrial property rights or other rights concerning technology, or for
establishment of a right to the use of the same, or for rendering technical
guidance in managerial know-how by the former, including renewal or
amendment of such an agreement (hereinafter referred to as "conclusion,
etc., of agreement for importation of technology") shall give a prior no-
tice, as a Cabinet Order provides for, to the Minister of Finance and the
Minister(s) in charge of the industry involved with those matters as des-
ignated by the Cabinet Order such as the particulars of that conclusion,
etc., of agreement for importation of technology and others.
2. The provisions of the preceding Paragraph shall not apply to
the conclusion, etc., of agreement for transfer of the technology which is
developed independently by a branch, etc., in Japan of a nonresident, or
to other cases determined by a Cabinet Order.
3. Any nonresident and resident who have given a notice under the
provisions of Paragraph 1 concerning the conclusion, etc., of agreement
for importation of technology mentioned in the same Paragraph shall not
execute the conclusion, etc., of agreement for importation of technology
under notice until a period of thirty (30) days has elapsed, counting from
the day of receipt of the notice by the Minister of Finance and the Minis-
ter(s) in charge of the industry involved. However, the Ministers may
shorten this period when they deem it not specifically harmful, judging
from the type of the technology and other condition(s) of the conclusion,
etc., of agreement for importation of technology under notice.
(Recommendation of alteration, etc., of conclusion, etc., of agree-
ment for importation of technology.)
Article 30
1. When a notice is given to the Minister of Finance and the Min-
ister(s) in charge of the industry involved under the provisions of Para-
graph 1 of the preceding Article, and the Ministers deem it necessary to
make an inquiry in order to determine whether the conclusion, etc. of
agreement for importation of technology under notice, if executed, would
cause apprehensions as to the occurrence of any one of the below men-
tioned consequences, they may extend the period during which the exe-
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cution of the conclusion, etc., of agreement for importation of technology
is prohibited up to four months, counting from the day of their receipt of
the notice.
1) It might imperil the national security, disturb the mainte-
nance of public order, or hamper the protection of the safety of the gen-
eral public; or
2) It might adversely and seriously affect activities of our
business enterprises engaging in a line of business similar or related to the
one for which the technology is to be imported, or the smooth perform-
ance of our national economy.
2. When a notice is given to the Minister of Finance and the Min-
ister(s) in charge of the industry involved under the provisions of Para-
graph 1 of the preceding Article, and the Ministers deem that if the
conclusion, etc., of agreement for importation of technology under notice
were executed it would cause apprehensions as to the occurrence of any
consequences mentioned in each Item of the preceding Paragraph, the
Ministers may, upon hearing the opinion of the Committee of Foreign
Exchange and Other Transactions mentioned in Article 55-2, recom-
mend the persons who gave the notice, as a Cabinet Order provides for,
either to alter the particulars of the conclusion, etc., of agreement for
importation of technology, in whole or in part, or to suspend the execu-
tion thereof, provided that such recommendation is given within the pe-
riod mentioned in the same Paragraph, or within the extended period
provided by the next Paragraph, counting from the day of their receipt of
the notice.
3. When the Committee on Foreign Exchange and Other Transac-
tions mentioned in Article 55-2 is asked for its opinion for the inquiry
mentioned in Paragraph 1, and tenders its intimation that to form its
opinion within the period of four (4) months as provided by the same
Paragraph during which the conclusion, etc., of agreement for importa-
tion of technology is prohibited, shall become five (5) months, irrespec-
tive of the provisions of the same Paragraph.
4. When recommendation is given under the provisions of Para-
graph 2, the provisions of Article 27, Paragraph 4 through Paragraph 9
shall be applicable thereto mutatis mutandis, and a Cabinet Order shall




Cabinet Order concerning Direct Domestic Investments, etc., Ordi-
nance No. 1, Oct. 11, 1980.
Chapter III Conclusion, etc., of Agreements for Importation of
Technology
Article 4
1. Prior notices provided in Article 29, Paragraph 1 of the Law
shall be made in accordance with the procedures determined by an Ordi-
nance of the competent Ministry, within a period determined by the Min-
ister of Finance and the Minister in charge of the industry involved,
which shall be no longer than a three-month period prior to the intended
date of conclusion, etc., of agreements for importation of technology pro-
vided in the same Paragraph (hereinafter referred to as the "conclusion,
etc., of agreements for importation of technology").
2. When a person who is required to make a prior notice under the
provisions of Article 29, Paragraph 1 of the Law is as nonresident, he
shall appoint a resident as his proxy, and the latter shall make such a
prior notice. (Such a resident proxy shall be limited to the one entitled to
receive documents delivered under the provisions of Paragraph 1 and
Paragraph 3 of the next Article.)
3. "Those matters as designated by the Cabinet Order" provided
in Article 29, Paragraph 1 of the Law shall be the following ones:
1) Name, place of domicile or residence, nationality, and occu-
pation of the parties involved in the conclusion, etc., of agreements for
importation of technology (for a judicial person, its name, location of its
main office, description of the business it is engaged in, amount of its
capital, and the name of its representative);
2) Type of the technology, and its quid pro quo subject to the
conclusion, etc., of agreements for importation of technology;
3) Time of the conclusion, etc., of agreements for importation of
technology;
4) Reason of the conclusion, etc., of agreements for importation
of technology;
5) In addition to those mentioned in the preceeding Items,
terms, and conditions of the conclusion, etc., of agreements for importa-
tion of technology, and any other matter designated by and Ordinance of
the competent Ministry.
4. "Other cases determined by a Cabinet Order" provided in Arti-
cle 29, Paragraph 2 of the Law shall be the conclusion, etc., of agree-
ments for importation of technology concerning technical guidance for
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managerial know-how (excluding those designated by the Minister of Fi-
nance and the Minister in charge of the industry involved.)
Ordinance concerning Direct Domestic Investments, etc., Ordi-
nance No. 1, Nov. 20, 1980.
(Prior notice, etc., of conclusion, etc., of agreements for importation
of technology)
Article 3
1. When a nonresident.. .and a resident are to file a prior notice
under provisions of Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Order, they shall fill in
a form attached hereto as Appendix 9, and file it with the Minister of
Finance and the Minister in charge of the industry involved, through the
BOJ, within a three-month period prior to the intended date of conclu-
sion, etc., of the agreement for importation of technology provided in
Article 29, Paragraph 1 of the Law (hereinafter referred to as "conclu-
sion, etc., of an agreement for importation of technology"). For the
number of such a prior notice, the provisions of the latter part of Article
2, Paragraph 3 shall be applicable.
2. When the Minister of Finance and the Minister in charge of the
industry involved have received a prior notice under the provisions of the
preceding Paragraph, they shall enter therein a note to that effect, and
deliver one copy thereof to the notifier as a receipt.
3. A person who is to inform the Minister of Finance and the Min-
ister in charge of the industry involved as provided in Article 27, Para-
graph 4 of the Law, whose mutatis mutandis application is provided in
Article 30, Paragraph 4 thereof, under the provisions of Article 5, Para-
graph of the Order, shall do so by submitting a note in a form attached
hereto as Appendix 10 to the said Ministers through the Bank of Japan.
For the number of such a note, the provisions of the latter part of Article
2, Paragraph 6 shall be applicable.
(Reports)
Article 4
2. When a nonresident and a resident who made conclusion, etc.,
of an agreement for importation of technology under a prior notice pro-
vided in Article 29, Paragraph 12 of the Law, have performed a transac-
tion as mentioned in one of the following items, they shall report to that
effect to the Minister of Finance and the Minister in charge of the indus-
try involved, through the BOJ, in a form designated in the said Item,
within a thiry-day period after the date of such a transaction or act. For
the number of such a report, the provisions of the latter part of the pre-
ceding paragraph shall be applicable.





2. When a prior notice provided in Article 26, Paragraph 3 of the
Law, or Article 29, Paragraph 1 thereof, covering a transaction or act
mentioned in one of the following Items, is on file with the Minister of
Finance and the Minister in charge of the industry involved, and the
Ministers deem the transaction or act to be not specifically harmful, they
shall inform the notifier, in a manner provided in the preceding para-
graph, and on the date mentioned in the said Item that the transaction or
act may be executed on or after that date.
2) Conclusion, etc., of an agreement for importation of technology
falling under a), b), c), or d) below-The day of receipt of the
prior notice;
a) Conclusion, etc., of an agreement for importation of tech-
nology, exluding conclusion, etc., of an agreement for the im-
portation of designated technology;
b) Conclusion, etc., of an agreement for importation of the
designated technology, whose amount of the proceeds payable
to a nonresident or resident (excepting travelling expenses to
and from Japan, and staying expenses in Japan, and the same
shall apply in this Item) is an equivalent to one hundred million
(Y 100,000,000) yen or less, or nil;
c) Conclusion, etc., of an agreement for importation of the
designated technology, intending to change a party or parties to
a previous agreement, without any other alteration of terms and
conditions of that previous agreement, provided that a prior no-
tice of conclusion, etc., of that previous agreement has already
been fied under the provisions of Article 29, Paragraph 1 of the
Law, and the conclusion, etc., thereof has already been qualified
to be executable; or
d) Conclusion, etc., of an agreement for importation of the
designated technology, intending to renew or to amend the
terms and conditions of a previous agreement, whose amount of
proceeds payable to a nonresident or nonresidents exceeds an
equivalent to one hundred million (Y100,000,000) yen, or is
unascertainable whether to be the said equivalent or less, pro-
vided that a prior notice of the conclusion, etc., of that previous
agreement has already been filed under the provisions of Article
29, Paragraph 1 of the Law, and the conclusion, etc., thereof
has already been qualified to be executable (exluding the one
involving a new type of the designated technology which was
not contained in the precious agreement).
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3) Conclusion, etc., of an agreement for importation of the desig-
nated technology other than those mentioned in b), c), or d) of
the preceding Item-The day after the elapse of a two-week pe-




THE FLOW OF STEPS FOR THE PROLONGATION OF THE PERIOD OF
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Appendix H
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DATE OF NOTIFICATION SUBMISSION AND
DATE OF PERMITTED CONTRACT PERFORMANCE
Technology type a t Under 100 million yen Over 100 million yen
1. Aircraft
N D 2. Arms
E E 3. Gun powder
W S 4. Atomic Power
I 5, Space development PERFORMANCE PERFOMANCE PERMIT-:
C0 Computecs PERMITTED ON DAY OF TED AFTER TWO-WEEK
N 7. Next generation of NOTIFICATION (SAME PERIOD OF NON-PER-'
N A computers DAY) MANCE'
T T 8.san
R E 9. Innovative mat-
A D erials
C 10. Salt electrolysis
T T by norm.ecnal
S E method




technologies SAME DAY SAME DAY
M C Involving designated TWOWEEK PERIOD OF
0 0 technologis SAME DAY NON-PERFORMANCE
I R
E C Not Involving designated
D T technologies SAME DAY SAME DAYS
Change in contract parties only SAME DAY SAME DAY
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Source: Science and Technology Agency, Annual
Report on Importation of Technology, 1983, p. 7.
